it tes lon Ry ia 


SKETCH 
ee Ae 


MILITARY CAREER 


j Williar m J. Hardee 


Lieutenant-General C. S. A. 


: WRITTEN AT THE REQUEST OF THE 
_ TENNESSEE HISTORICAL SOCIETY 


ot WwW. De PICKETT 


LEXINGTON, KY. : 
JAMES E, HUGHES, PRINTER 


Srp santas tT A th = 7 near eh oy ye 


SKETCH OF THE MILITARY CAREER 
OF WILLIAM J. HARDEE 


The letter following will explain itself: 
HEADQUARTERS TENNESSEE HISTORICAL SOCIETY 
| ? NASHVILLE, February 2nd, 1910. 
Cou. W. D. PIcK=tt, : . 
Lexington, Kentucky, 
DEAR SIR: 

Our State Historical Society is engaged in the laudable under- 
taking of procuring, collating and preserving in its archives, all 
of the principal events, incidents, etc., connected with and pertain- 
ing to, the late war between the States, so tar as it may be possible, 
and also a short biographical sketch of the principal actors, both 
civil and military, who were engaged in that great struggle, so thay 
posterity may have—approximately at least—a fair and hones: 
presentation of our—the Southern side—of the many questions that 
were involved in this war and settled by it. 

Among the many military men of this ciass we find the name of 
that patriotic, brave and excellent Corps Commander, Lieutenant 
General William J. Hardee, of whom, I am sorry to say, so little 
has been said and written by the eatherers and compilers of Con- 
federate History. 

Such should not longer be allowed to be the case, relative to 
him, for there is no. one of his rank in the Southern army, more 
entitled or more worthy of honorable mention and remembrance 
than General Hardee. 

- Our Society then, believing, and in fact knowing, that at this 
time, and likely at no other time, there is no one better suited and 
qualified, than yourself, to make a correct presentation of the life 
‘iat character of General H., I am directed to present the matter 
Ao you and to ask that you furnish such a sketch of him as you think 
his life, both private and military, would justify you to make. The 
Society would greatly appreciate the favor and would be well 
pleased to have the manuscript filed among its records and archives 
for reference and aid to future historians and antiquaries. [| 
think it is a duty we owe to posterity to hand down to the extent 
of our abilitv, a correct and comprehensive compendium of Con- 


Southern Pamphlets 
Rare Book Collection 
UNC-Chapel Hill 


3993987 


he 


federate history together with the estimate that contemporaries 
placed upon the leading characters connected with that history. 

This is why our Society is taking such an active interest along 
this line. Believing that you entertain a like opinion, is our 
excuse for making this application at this time. 

Hoping that it may be both pleasant and convenient for you to 
comply with this request 

I remain with high regard, 
Your obedient servant, 
GHORGE C. PORTER. 


In compliance to the request conveyed by Colonel Porter in a 
manner so flattering, the writer reluctantly accepts the task as- 
signed by this distinguished society and begs leave. to append a 
summary of such events and acts that have a bearing on the sub- 
ject matter of this paper. The task is not a pleasant one, recalling 
as its does, the many hardships and horrors of that bloody struggle; 
and worse still, there is recalled the loss of the long list of noble 
spirits, that succumbed in battle or the hospital. 

Having served on the staff of this distinguished officer from 
January 4, 1862, to the end, (the surrender and parole of the army 
under General Jo. E. Johnston, at Greensboro, N. C., on the 26th 
of April, 1865, about three and a half years) it would seem, that 
he had exceptional opportunities for the task assigned him. 

On the other hand, an opinion might be entertained by some, 
that anv sketch of the military career of a General officer by one 
of his staff, associated with him for more than three years, amid 
the hardships and horrors of actual war, would naturally show so 
much bias as to be unreliable. . 

For that reason, what follows will be confined to General Hardee’s 
military record and will be based on the writer’s personal observa- 
tion and upon facts that are of record and that have passed into 
history. 

You very properly deplore, that the so-called “gatherers and com- 
pilers of Confederate history” have little to say of the services of 
such a prominent actor in that conflict as William J. Hardee, and 
you might have added, the names of many other distinguished 
officers. 

Your opinion is more than emphasized after inspecting a much 
advertised painting, styled “Lee and his Generals,” some of whose 
figures overshadow that of the great Lee himself. You fail to 
recognize such faces as Hardee, or Cleburne, or Cheatham, or Bate 
or other distinguished officers of the Army of Tennessee. On the 
contrary there are faces on that canvass that were scarcely heard of, 
whilst “the fight was on.” 


3 


This should not be so.. The Tennessee Historical Society are 
engaged in a noble work and should be encouraged in every way by 
the survivors of that struggle. 

William J. Hardee was by instinct a soldier. Upon this natural 
instinct was grafted the advantages of « four-years’ study and 
training at the West Point Military Academy. This was followed 
by active service in the field during. the entire war with Mexico, 
during, which he earned honorable distinction and received com- 
mensurate promotion. 

Afterwards he was for several years the Commandant of the 
Corps of Cadets at West Point. Hither during this command or 
subsequent thereto, he was ordered to visit Europe, study the 
military tactics of their several armies and to compile an “up-to- 
date” system of tactics for the infantry and cavalry of the United 
States Army. The result of his labors, compiled from the highest 
Kuropean standards, was adopted by his government and published 
with his name attached. ‘‘Hardee’s System of Tactics” was fol- 
lowed by each of the opposing armies during the subsequent war 
between the states. 

This training in the art military heretofore outlined, was in- 
valuable to, him afterwards, when in command of large bodies of 
troops in that conflict. Hardee realized to the fullest extent, that 
the soldier, the man that carried the musket and did the shooting 
and used the bayonet in battle, must be weli shod and clothed and 
well fed and kept in health. This impressed upon him the im- 
portance of a well organized commissary department and quarter- 
master department. He must be furnished with a good shooting 
iron, with an abundance of ammunition. This necessitated a well 
organized ordinance department. Then last, but not least, there 
must be a well organized medical department to take care of the 
sick and wounded. The soldier, in going into battle, if killed no 
matter; but if wounded he must believe that just in his rear is 
a surgeon and corps of brave and stalwart litter bearers, to give 
temporary relief, bear him to the rear to a field hospital and thence 
to some general ‘hospital where his wounds can be attended to and 
his other wants supplied. 

As a means for carrying to sucess all movements of the corps 
Hardee surrounded himself with a corps of courageous and efficient 
staff officers, adjutant, department of orders, inspection depart- 
ment to see that orders were carried out and so with commissary, 
quartermaster, ordinance and medical departments. 

Hardee realized more than most commanding officers, that a 
soldier in going into battle must have the utmost confidence in 
his superior officers. He must know from past experience that 
in going into battle all his wants will be provided for and that 


4 


he will not be uselessly exposed. Then he goes in with a stomach 
to win. On the contrary, if he realizes around him a half-hazard 
organization, he loses confidence in his higher officers and it teits 
in the day’s fighting. 

The principal cause of Hardee’s success in battle, is that he 
at all times commanded the respect of his subordinates, from the 
Division Comander to the man in the ranks who carried the musket. 
His corps was always a unit, all inspired with the loftiest patriot- 
ism and with the utmost confidence in their commander. 

This mutual confidence and unity of feeling among the con- 
stituent elements of the corps, is the main cause of its uniform 
success in battle. In all the battles of this corps, when under his 
command; Shiloh, Perryville, Murfreesboro, Missionary Ridge, 
all the engagements of the Atlanta campaign ending with the fall 
of the latter city, this corps never turned its back to the foe in 
battle. During the battle of Chickamauga this corps was com- 
manded by General D. H. Hill, Hardee being on detached service 
in Mississippi, since the middle of July. Can more or as much 
be said of any corps of the entire Confederate Army? 

General Hardee realized from the beginning, the magnitude of 
the war in which the South was engaged. Having spent quite 
a number of years at West Point and Washington he realized the 
power and resources of the North and had no sympathy with the 
foolish idea that prevailed too much after the battle of the first 
“Bull Run” that one Southerner was equal to five “Yanks,” a 
feeling of over confidence that contributed much to our failure. 

In the spring of 1861 Hardee was commissioned by the Con- 
federate War Department as Colonel of Cavalry and given the 
Command of Fort Morgan, protecting Mobile. He was soon pro- 
moted as Birgadier General and given Command of the organized 
troops west of the Mississippi river. 

In the early fall of 1861, the Federal government commenced 
concentrating an army at Munfordsville, Kentucky, on the Louis- 
ville and Nashville Railroad, under Command of General D. C. 
Buell. 

To meet this movement General Albert Sydney Johnston, Com- 
manding the Western Department, transferred Hardee’s Command 
as rapidly as possible to Bowling Green, Kentucky, about forty 
miles south of Munfordsville. This force together with troops, 
raised in Kentucky by General S. B. Buckner formed the neucleus 
of what was designated “The Army of Central Kentucky.” W. J. 
Hardee promoted to Major General as Commander. As Bowling 
Green appeared the most vulnerable point in the Confederate line of 
defense, General Johnston’s headquarters were transferred from 
Columbus to that point. (See Appendix C.) 


D 


The campaign in the West of 1862, opened with the following 
dispositions of the opposing forces. The right of the Confederate 
line under Hardee was at Bowling Green, Ky., with an effective 
total of, not exceeding, 22,000 infantry and artillery. Opposing 
him at Munfordsville Was the Federal Army, under General Buell, 
of 40,000 men, as reported. The left of the Confederate line was 
at Odlunibus, Ky., on the Mississippi river, under General Polk, 
with about 13,000 men. Confronting Polk at Cairo was General 
Grant, with an army of from 15,000 to 20,000 men. Columbus 
had been made impregnable from an attack by water, by a system 
of batteries covering about one mile of the river front. The position 
might be taken in rear, by landing a superior force at Paducah, 
with a short march by land. 

The center of the Confederate line was on the Tennessee river, 
near the mouth of Sandy and was defended by an earth work fort, 
mounting eleven heavy guns, Fort Henry. 

The opposite side of the river was wanting, in any proper de- 
fensive work as had been ordered, by General Johnston. It is under- 
stood the rear of this Fort was commanded by ground in the rear. 
Fort Donelson, a fort opposite on the Cumberland river had a 
stronger natural position and was so well defended by «effective 
batteries, as subsequently, to repulse an attack of the gun boats 
and conpelled General Grant to reduce the field work in the rear, 
before its surrender. 

The campaign of 1862 in the West was about to open. Iis 
result must be of momentous consequence to the Confederacy. If 
favorable it meant the retention of the beef and grain states of 
Tennessee and Mississippi and their splendid population, as also 
the control of that great artory of commerce and inter-communica- 
tion between the states, the mighty Mississipi river. If the result 
of the campaign was unfavorable, it meant the loss of control of 
the ‘ennessee river as far as Florence, Alabama, with the imme- 
diate evacuation of the state of Tennessee. In the near future it 
meant the complete control of the Mississippi river with its means 
of transporting large bodies of troops. It so happens that most 
of the steamboats on the Mississippi and Ohio rivers were owned 

t. Louis, Louisville, Cincinnati and Pittsburg. As soon as 
the clouds of war began to lower, these steamboats were gradually 
moved north of Cairo and when the lines were closed at. Memphis, 
about April 1st, 1861, very few-of these boats were caught below 
that point. This was a most serious disadvantage to the South, 
for with such means of transportation at hand, the Federal author- 
ities could move a large army to any point on these streams and 
tributaries in a few days. 

It may be well to take a retrospect of military affairs up to this 


6 


time. It has, for a long time, been the opinion of the writer that the 
victory of the Southern arms at Bull Run, whilst in one sense, a 
brilliant victory, 1t resulted, in another sense, as a disaster. Had 
the success been followed up by the capture of Washington and 
Baltimore, and a peace forced, at that time, the victory would have 
borne fruit. As it resulted, it created an over-weaning confidence 
in the South of their strength, not justified by facts.. This over 
confidence had at once a perceptible effect im a decrease of volun- 
teers to the rank of the army in the eee for the first year after . 
that victory. 

It had a contrary effect on the nea of the North. Tt con- 
vinced them of the size of the job they bad undertaken and that 
the time for vigorous action had arrived. 

To have successfully defended the long line in the West, here- 
tofore described, it would have required an additional force of 
50,000 men. Where were they to be had? Over confidence was a 
primitive cause for this deficit. 

These thoughts have often occurred and are recorded with the 
frank admission that it is much easier to criticise past events 
than to foresee and provide remedies against. future ills. 

In the latter part of January Grant commenced developing his 
plan of campaign. A feint was first made by sending Critten- 
den’s division up Green river to a point within about fifty miles 
of Bowling Green. ‘To meet this advance a division of about 
6,000 men, under General Buckner, was detached from Hardee's 
command. As Grant’s real object was Fort Henry on the Tennessee 
river, Crittenden’s command was soon re-embarked and Buck- 
ner’s division was gradually moved aroun: toward Fort Donelson, 
reaching that point in time to take an active part in opposing the 
attack of Grant, which eventually culminated in its surrender on 
the 16th of February. | 

It so happened that about the time it. had developed that Grant 
was moving on Fort Henry it chanced some business with Colonel 
Mackall, General Johnston’s Chief of Stafi, caused the writer to 
drop into his office. It so happened that he had just learned 
that the defensive works on the opposite side of the river, from 
Fort Henry had not been constructed. 

Only three were present in the room. General Johnston was 
walking back and forth in the room in long strides, apparently 
very much excited. “It is most extraordinary—I ordered General 
Polk four months ago to at once construct those works and now 
with the enemy on us, nothing of importance has been done. It 
is most extraordinary, most extraordinary,” repeating these words 
in the most emphatic language. I had met this grand man qnite 


7 


often at Columbus and was much attached to him. I never saw 
him so much wrought up before. 

The evacuation of Bowling Green on his orders, was at once 
quietly commenced and continued till its evacuation on the 13th 
of February. All the siege guns and all cther material and stores 
were successfully removed by rail—except some quartermaster and 
commissary stores the removing of which was not attempted but 
were burned on the morning of the evacuation of the post on the 
13th of February. 

Fort Henry surrendered on February 6th, with about eighty 
artillery men—the infantry garrison of 2,600 men making a timely 
retreat to Donelson. 

Fort Donelson surrendered with its large garrison, under General 
Buckner on the 16th of February. * 

The rear guard of Hardee’s command, General Hindman’s 
brigade, evacuated Bowling Green on the 13th of February after 
having destroyed the commissary stores that could not be removed, 
the advance brigade of Buell’s army arriving on the heights on 
the opposite side of Barren river and throwing a few shells as a 
parting salute. Barren river at this point and for several miles 
each way passes through a deep gorge that is impassable except 
at the bridge at the crossing of the turnpike leading to Munfords- 
ville. This bridge had been burned at daylight after crossing 
over, scouts to go north until the enemy was met and then report 
by the best route. 

The surrender of Fort Donelson with the way open to the 
enemys gunboats to Nashville rendered it compulsory that Har- 
dee’s command should be rushed forward by rail and otherwise, 
before the bridges over the Cumberland river could be destroyed, 
as they were the only means of crossing that stream, with Buell’s 
much superior force, supposedly rapidly advancing in the rear. 

The enemy did not realize their opportunity and nothing trans- 
pired of moment until this command had crossed into Nashville. 

After a few days rest Hardee’s Bowling Green command, now 
the rear guard of the army, marched leisurely to Murfreesboro, 
thence through Shelbyville, Huntsville, Decatur and Tuscumbia, 
Seas in the latter part of March, Corinth, Miss., the point 

ected by General Johnston, as the rendezvous of all of the 
troops of his department east of the Mississippi river. 

It is not within the province of this sketch to give in detail the 
events of this eventful campaign, but only so much as will prac- 
tically substantiate an opinion advanced in the forepart of this 
sketch. 

“Tn all the battles of Hapdes’s. hese (with some few changes. 
in its division) Shiloh, Perryville, Murfreesboro, Missionary Ridge, 


8 


all the engagements of the Atlanta.campaign, ending in the fall in 
Atlanta, this corps never turned its back to the foe in battle.” 

The evacuation of Bowling Green, after moving to the rear all 
ordinance and ordinance stores and other impediments; thence 
acting as the rear guard to the army for at least 300 miles, though 
not a brilliant affair, to do it satisfactorily, requires energy, skill 
and military experience. 

The troops concentrated at Corinth consisted of Polk’s com- 
mand from Columbus, Ky.; Hardee’s command from Bowling 
Green, Ky.; General George Crittenden’s command, from the Fish- 
ing Creek Line, General Brage’s command from Pensacola, Fla., 
and the odds and ends of small detachments from other points. 

Before going into battle these troops had to be organized into 
brigades, divisions and corps, and as General Buell’s army, from 
Nashville,-was on the march to form a junction with General 
Grant’s army (that had successfully reduced Fort Donelson and 
Fort Henry) at Pittsburg landing, on the Tennessee river, very 
httle time was given for this necessary work. It was completed, 
however, as thoroughly as possible for raw troops about the first 
of April. 

On the third of April the army was put in motion for a move- 
ment on Grant’s army, with his advance, camped in the vicinity 
of Shiloh Church in front of Pittsburg landing. 

The third corps under Hardee, and consis ting of the com- 
mands brought from Kentucky, with a few additions was in the 
advance and with Gladden’s brigade of Bragg’s corps, was to 
form the front line of battle. 

‘The second corps under Bragg, was to form the second line of 
battle, one thousand yards in rear of the first line. 

The first corps under Major-General Polk, was to form the 
third line of. battle, stationed six hundred yards in rear of the 
second line. 

A division of three brigades under Brigadier-General Breckin- 
ridge was held as a reserve. 

Hardee’s corps reached the vicinity of the Mickie House on the 
evening of April the third, and early. the next morning formed line 
of battle a short distance in front, Colonel Cleburne’s brigade 
covering the road to Shiloh Church. 

For sufficient cause the expected advance was not made on the 
fourth, as originally intended. In the forenoon the cavalry brought. 
‘in eight or ten cavalry men in brand new uniforms, of the enemy. 
In the afternoon, whilst Hardee was on the battle line with 
Cleburne, some desultory firing was heard in the front. Soon 
a few cavalry men came in sight, then more and more firing, then 
‘apparently a regiment of cavalry came in view dashing madly 


BY 


9 


on in a complete panic. As they came nearer, Cleburne took in 
the situation, withdrew a company of the Fifth Tennessee, Colonel 
Hill, from the road to allow them to pass, through which they 
passed in a mad rush, the Colonel.bringirg up the rear, with the 
appearance of heart-felt mortification. Following close on the 
heels of the last Confederates, was a Federal sergeant, well mounted 
and a fine rider, who was so intent on the business in hand, that 
he charged up within fifty yards of the Infantry line, before 
taking in the situation. Instead of surrendering, as demanded, 
he pulled up his horse wheeled to his left and as he did so 
fired, with his revolver, into the infantry rank wounding a man. 
Just then a volley from the infantry belched forth, the man and 
the horse falling in a heap. That gallant fellow deserved a better 
fate. J think he belonged to the 11th Illinois Cavalry. Before 
night, Cleburne gave that man honorable burial, just where he 
lay. 

A section of artillery fired several rounds. This cavalry regi- 
ment was, today, having its first experierice in actual war and 
being inexperienced, in getting mixed up with the enemy’s cavalry, 
took one of the unexplainable panics. With more experience it 
became one of the best regiments of the service. 

These details are given to indicate, that ordinary vigilance on the 
part of General Sherman, who commanded the advance division 
of General Grant’s army, should have caused him to send a re- 
connaissance in force to determine what was in his front, for this 
artillery fire could have been plainly audible and the cavalry saw 
the artillery and line of infantry. 

Hardee’s line, the third corps, made an early advance on the 
fifth of April, in such formation as would admit of a speedy order 
of battle line, the front being well covered with cavalry. Whea 
close to the enemy’s pickets, the line of battle was formed, with 
all arrangements made for an attack. 

It appears that General Beauregard was of opinion, that it ‘was 
now too late for an attack; for the reason that General Buell, 
had had time to form a junction with Grant; and advised the 
Confederate army be withdrawn. General Johnston thereupon 
called a council of war, stated the situation and asked the advice 
of/ ‘the corps and division commanders. 

“Tt was understood that the almost unanimous advice of the 
council was for immediate attack, Hardee among the majority. 
After a full discussion, it was determined by General Johnston, 
to begin the attack at about davlight on the sixth of April with 
strict orders that no fires should be lighted at night. 

The battle order delivered that night was laconic. “The forces 
will move at 5:40 o’clock tomorrow morning.” ‘To insure simul- 


° 


10 


taneous movement of the two wings, Hardee sent a staff officer to 
the commanding officer of each wing, with a watch to time. 
The writer delivering the order to General Gladden commanding 


the brigade on the night of the line of battle was asked “which — , 


way?” “Move forward,” the answer. General Gladden fell mortally. 
wounded the first day. He was a brave, gallant, well-trained officer. 

The troops had enjoyed a good rest after their tramp from 
Corinth, ‘were in splendid condition and in fine spirits for the 
attack. 

The front line, with scarcely any resistence swept through the 
first camps. There was every evidence of a complete surprise. 
This was more in evidence to the writer who was ordered soon 
after the first camp were swept over, to search for the enemy's 
reserve ammunition, as the third corps went into the fight with 
only sixty rounds of ammunition per musket. ‘This necessitated 
a thorough search which indicated every evidence of a surprise. An 
abundance of # munition was found and the command in front 
notified of its aey. 

here was so much timber in all parts of the field, that a staff 
officer after carrying orders had great cifficulty in finding his | 
chief, who was also constantly changing his position. "That 
occurred with me and after a vain attempt to find my chief and 
meeting up with General Bragg, my dilemma was stated and he 
made use of me for some time in carrying orders, as he himself 
was deficient as to his own staff. 

It will be recalled that the battle field of Shiloh was an open, 
post oak woods, with an. occasional cultivated field, the woods 
largely predominating. Sometimes those open woods were filled 
in by dense oak brush. The onslaught of the first line of battle 
in the center was not checked till about. noon when there ‘was 
encountered in one of these areas of ‘brush, what was afterwards 
called “‘the hornets nest.” A country road passing through one of 
_ these oak thickets had become so worn and washed out by rains, 
that by lying flat a man was pretty well protected. As the Federal 
lines retired, this road bed suiting the direction of their line, was 
quickly occupied. ‘The front, being covered by this oak thicket, 
our men in advancing were allowed to approach within short 
range, when a deadly volley was delivered, always adn ae mM 
bloody repulse. 

About this time, the three lines in the rear of the third corps 
in their eagerness to join in the fight had moved so swiftly forward 
that the check given the first line, caused them all to. close in 
rear of each other. The right of Cheatham was just in rear of the 
“Hornet’s Nest”—Breckinridge was on his right. I carried 
orders to each of these officers. The Federals in the “Hornet’s 


11 


Nest” repulsed repeated attacks of our men and were os dis- 
lodged finally by a flank and rear attack. 

After this position was passed over there was not much fighting, 
until the enemy’s camp on the bluffs, overlooking the Tennessee 
river, was reached when by a concentrated charge in front and 
flanks, Prentiss division was surrounded and captured some 
2,000 prisoners with the commanding officer. This charge brought 
together portions of the divisions of each of the three corps. 

There were soon assembled on this open Generals Bragg, Hardee, 
Polk and Breckinridge. In front, at the foot of the bluffs, flowed 
the ‘Tennessee river, hidden from the view by trees and underwood. 

The only sign of resistance was the fire of a Federal battery 
about five hundred yards to the left, located. on the bluff just above 
Pittsburg landing. It was firing grape shot apparently, but doing 
no damage. No time was lost in congratulations at our success, 
but the different commands were being quickly re-organized, getting 
ready for a final onslaught. It is distinctly recollected there were 
three lines formed facing that battery. These several lines oc- 
cupied depressions at the head of gulches leading to the river, but 
which were hidden from the view of the gunboats and afforded 
good protection from the fire of Webster’s Federal battery. 1+ 
was three-quarters of an how to an hour before sundown and 
there appeared ample time to finish the job. The men were in 
high feather and ready for the onslaught. The gunboats were 
not firmg“probably not knowing yet the position of affairs. 

Suddenly to the disappointment of everybody, an order came 
from the General in Command, Beauregard (as General John- 
ston had fallen about noon) for the army to withdraw from under 
the fire of the gunboats and bivouac for the night. That order 
had a demoralizing effect on the army. It was then there was 
needed the iron will of General Albert Sydney Johnston. 

As afterwards ascertained, the front division of Buell’s army 
had not arrived and the disordered remnants of Grant’s army 
were massed in the river bottom at Pittsburg landing without 
much organization and by a vigorous attack of the Confederates 
would, have quickly surrendered as the gunboats on the river could 
ane afforded no assistance without firing into their own 1nen. 

e army retired about a mile and bivouacked among the 
enemies camp. 

During the night the bulk of Buell’s army about 30,000 men 
strong, came to the relief of Grant’s beaten army and at daylight 
commenced expanding its lines and soon-came in contact with the 
Confederate reformed lines. These fresh, well organized troops 
were more than a match for their opponents, tired and leg weary 


12 


after an all day’s fight the day before and still worse, despondent 
at being deprived of the fruits of their vaior. 

After ineffectual attempts to break through the Federal line, 
the General-in-Chief, determined to withdraw his army and retire 
back to Corinth. 

This ‘withdrawal was successfully accomplished about noon of 
the seventh of April. The enemy were satisfied to be left alone, 
did not pursue and without any mishap of consequence, the bulk 
of the army, on the afternoon and night of the eighth of April were 
distributed in camps in' and around Corinth. 

These few details of the Shiloh battle are given from memory, 
and are what the writer saw or was well cognizant of. Nothing 
could be seen on that day except immediately around one, on ac- 
count of the timber and occasionally brush. The writer’s testimony 
bears on two mooted questions: One as to whether Sherman was 
or should have been surprised; the other as to the condition of 
affairs after the surrender of Prentiss’ Division and the final ar- 
rangement for the last charge, at the time the order was given for 
the ‘withdrawal of the troops. M’y recollection of those events are 
very vivid, almost as much so as had they occurred on yesterday. 

The Confederate army lay at Corinth nearlv two months. It 
was re-inforced by the command of Geneial Van Dorn and Gen- 
eral Price from the Trans-Mississippi Department. When the 
severals commands had been consolidated they occupied a fortified 
line covering all the approaches to Corinth. Van Dorn occupying 
the extreme right, immediated on the right of Hardee’s corps. 

In the meantime the Federal authorities were not idle, but were 
gradually accumulating re-inforcements to the Grant-Buell army, 
until its effective strength approximately one hundred thousand 
men, with General Halleck, as General-in-Chief. This large army 
was cautiously advanced and soon came in contact with the fortified 
line of their opponent. In establishing their entrenched line of 
circumvallation, whilst there was no gencral engagements, there 
were sharp and determined fighting between brigades or smaller 
detachments in which the Confederates always held their own. 

The Confederates were, however, soon brought face to face with 
a new and insideous enemy, sickness. The water about Corinth, 
mostly from wells, proved very unwholesome and soon caused an 
epidemic of that worst of all camp diseases, dysentery, which soon 
decimated the fighting strength of the army. 

In the latter part of May, General Beauregard planned an attack 
on the left flank and rear of the Federal Army. 

Hardee’s corps and Van Dorn’s corps by a night march moved 
around and obtained an advantageous position on the enemy’s 
flank, by 10 o’clock in the forenoon, and were ready for the 


13 


onslaught, men and officers in fine spirits. Suddenly and for no 
apparent good reason the attack was called off, and the troops 
ordered back to their old intrenchments. It was thought at the 
time this was unfortunate for it decreased the confidence of the 
army, in the capacity of their chief. 

In the meantime sickness among the troops did not decrease, but 
rather the contrary, as warm weather approached. From this 
cause and from more definite knowledge of the much superior force 
of the enemy, it was determined to withdraw the army from Corinti: 
to some healthier locality in the rear. ‘Tupelo, Mississippi, miles 
from. Corinth, having been selected, a salubrious location on the 
Mobile and Ohio railroad. 

This withdrawal was commenced on the night of May 20th, and 
was successfully accomplished. All stores, all the sick and wounded 
were successfully conveyed to the rear. 

The enemy did not attempt to follow and harass, and in a 
week or ten days the several corps were settled down in their new 
encampments, around Tupelo, where the water was wholesome and 
the environments dry and healthy. The troops soon began to feel 
the benefit of the new location in improved health. 

The failure to secure the benefit of the first day’s victory at 
Shiloh Church, the withdrawal of the army back to Corinth, the 
depressing effect of sickness and finally the retiring of the forces 
still further South, without a fight, to ‘Tupelo; all these causes 
had a very depressing effect and resulted in much demoralization 
among the rank and file of the army. 

Besides 1t was composed, by massing together all the commands 
and detached fragments, from the Western Department on the 
eve of a great battle and sufficient time inrad not been allowed to 
assort and cement this hetero genious mass into brigades and divi- 
sions. It was absolutely necessary that this should be done before 
any further military operations. 

Fortunately at this time General Braxton Bragg succeeded, by 
seniority, to the command of the army, caused by the retirement 
of General Beauregard on account of continued bad health. 

As proven by subsequent events, General Brage developed “as 
the right man in the right place.” A strict disciplinarian, thor- 
oughly skilled in organization, there was no officer of the Con- 
federate Army more competent “to lick into shape” raw, half- 
demoralized troops and to force them down into something like 
discipline. In all this work he was ably assisted by General Hardee 
(scarcely second to him in those military virtues) and by the other 
corps and division commanders. — 

Their labors were soon rewarded by the improved morale of the 


14 


men, their improvement in drill and soldierly bearing and more 
important still in their marked improvement in discipline. 

The fall of Corinth resulted in the Federal control of the 
Mississippi river, as far as Memphis (practically as far as Vicks- 
burg) ; the occupation of the state of Tennessee west of the Cum- 
berland range and of the Tennessee river valley of northern Ala- 
bama. | 
After resting about Tupelo, Miss., about two months, with com- 
plete restoration to health and a marked improvement in discip- 
line and general efficiency, two corps of this army were transferred 
to Chattanooga, Tennessee together with all its artillery and 
wagontrains, prepared to take the offensive. . 

One of these corps (Cheatham’s and Wither’s divisions) was 
under the command of Major-General Polk; the other, under 
command of Major-General. Hardee, General 8. B. Buckner and 
General Patton Anderson being Division Commanders. 

This movement to Chattanooga fore-shadowed the celebrated 
Kentucky campaign. Bragg making a direct march to central 
Kentucky moving on to Buell’s rear and directly on his line of 
communications. 

In conjunction with this movement General Kirby Smith with a — 
column of 5,000 men, moved to the south of the fortified posi- 
tion of Cumberland Gap directly for Richmond and Lexington, 
the center of the Blue Grass region of Kentucky. The movement 
was brilhantly conceived and brilliantly executed and resulted in 
the evacuation of North Alabama, the entire state of ‘Tennessee 
west of the Cumberland range except Nashville and a few posts 
on the Mississippi river; gaining, for the time being, possession 
of all of central Kentucky with its rich stores of commissary and 
quartermaster supplies. 

The campaign resulted in two battles, one at Richmond and the 
other at Perryville, both complete victories for the Southern arms. 

General Bragg crossed the Tennessee river at Chattanooga on 
the 28th of August with two corps, representing an effective total 
of 29,000 men, moved rapidly through Sparta and Glasgow, Ky., 
getting on to Buell’s line of supply at Cave City, thence to Muns- 
fordville, Ky., where he surrounded and after some fighting forced 
the surrender of the sixteenth of September of the garrison of over 
four thousand prisoners with their arms and stores. Buell, in the 
meantime, had concentrated his army and was moving rapidly to 
overtake him, with a much superior army, so close that at Muns- 
fordville Bragg’s rear guard, skirmishing with his advance. 

General Bragg continued on the direct road to Louisville, to 
the vicinity of Hodgenville and there turned eastwardly to Bards- 


15 


town. Buell as he came up continuing on his route to Louisville 
declining to force Bragg to battle. 

General Bragg rested his command at Bardstown about a week. 
General Buell having received reinforcements and supplied his 
command with sufficient supplies for a campaign, moved on the 
army at Bardstown, left under the command of General Polk. 
(Bragg having gone ahead to Lexington for a conference with 
General Kirby Smith.) Polk moved the two corps in the direc- 
tion of Harrodsburg and had reached the village of Perryville, 
within ten miles of that point when General Bragg returned to 
the vicinity of the army. It is deemed unnecessary for the purpose 
of this sketch to detail various feints and maneuvers of Buell and 
the controverting maneuvers of Bragg to meet them. Suffice it that 
Bragg determined to force a battle in the vicinity of Perryville and 
ordered General Withers’ division to rejoin his corps at Perry- 
ville in. time for the expected battle fixed for the 8th of October. 
From some cause Wither’s division did not reach the field in time 
and the battle was joined on the eighth of October, with only three 
of the four divisions of the army. 

The line of battle was selected for an offensive movement diago- 
nally across a valley with Anderson’s division of Hardee’s corps 
on the left and Cheatham’s corps of Polk’s corps on the right of 
Buckner’s division. 

From one cause or another the advane was not made until about 
11 o'clock a. m., on the 8th of October. The troops were in splendid 
trim for the fight. The two divisions of Hardee’s corps, Patton, 
Anderson’s and Buckner’s and Cheatham’s division behaved with 
splendid gallantry and moved steadily forward without being effect- 
ually checked until sundown, when the field*had been swept clean of 
the enemy, capturing about six hundred prisoners. The three 
divisions that day contained an effective tctal of a little less than 
15,000 infantry and artillery. The enemy’s forces as afterward 
ascertained was about fifty per cent more. | 

Brage’s forces occupied the field until 12 o’clock at night, when 
on account of lack of supplies and the known strength of the 
enemy, they were withdrawn and the next day retired to Hiarrods- 
burg. Buell was again offered battle but declined to attack Bragg’: 

ow united army. 

The want of proper depots of supplies, the approach of the rainy 
season and the well-developed strength of Buell’s army, deiermined 
General Bragg to retire from Kentucky via. the Cumberland Gap, 
which had been evacuated by the Federal garrison about the 1st 
of October. The movement commenced from Harrodsburg on the 
1ith of October via Bryantsville, Crab Orchard, London, Bar- 
bourville and Cumberland Gap, to Knoxville. On or about Decem- 


16 


ber. 1st. Polk’s corps had been transferred to Murfreesboro and 
Hardee’s corps to Shelbyville, the latter soon moving up to Hagle- 
ville, a point opposite Polk’s position. 

As General Bragg truthfully states in his repert of this cam- 
paign, “In four weeks after passing Cumberland Gap in ths 
memorable and arduous campaign, jaded, hungry and ragged (as 
necessarily incident to such service) this noble army was found in 
serried rank in front of the enemy at Nashville, better organized, 
better disciplined, better clothed and fed, in better health and 
tone and in larger numbers, than when it entered on the cam- 
paign.” : 

The details of the concentration of the army of Tennessee, by 
the transfer of Hardee’s corp from Eagleville to Murfreesboro on 
December 28th, 1862, has been given in a sketch (published in 
the Confederate Veteran) of the events leading up to that battle 
and will not be repeated. Brigadier Cleburne promoted to. Major- 
General ‘was given command of Buckner’s division, that officer 
having been given a higher command. General J. C. Breckin- 
ridge returned from the movement on Port Hudson was given — 
command of the other division of which Hanson’s Kentucky Brigade 
formed a part. 

These two divisions, at first, formed the mght of the army, with 
the left resting on Stone’s river, Breckinridge in front, Cleburne 
in rear as a support. Polk’s corps formed the left wing with the 
right of Wither’s division, forming the front line resting on 
Stone’s river, supported by Cheatham’s division in rear. This 
was the formation on the morning of December 30th. During 
that day, however, Rosencranz commenced extending his right 
wing, under McCook so as to overlap’ Polk’s left, so far that 
McCown’s division held in reserve was advanced to General 
Wither’s left. Cleburne’s division was then withdrawn, hastily, 
from the extreme right of the army and placed in position to 
support McCown. 

Lieutenant General Hardee was given command of the left wing 
of the army. 

Rosencranz had thus accomplished his purpose of weakening the 
Confederate right so that he would be enabeled to cross a large 
force the next morning over Stone’s river and throw it on: the 
Confederate right, hoping to find, then, a clear way to Murfreesboro. ° 
He reckoned without his host, however. Brage’s plan of battie 
appears to have been quickly formed; which was by a vigorous 
attack at daylight on the Federal right by: Hardee’s corps, to doubte 
it back on his center, the entire army left of Stone’s river to join’ 
in with a swing to the right with Polk’s right as the pivot. 

At daylight of a foggy drizzly morning McCown’s division with 


Té 


Cleburne in close support made a vigorous onslaught on the enemy, 
who were so much surprised that a battery of artillery was captured 
before the horses were hitched and the brigade commander, Gen- 
eral Willich with many of his men taken prisoners. This success- 
ful onslaught was vigorously followed up and line after line of 
the enemy were routed and disposed. In making the swing to the 
right McCown’s division, in following the enemy, had gradually 
moved off to the left leaving an interval between his division and 
Wither’s. Cleburne taking in the situation promptly filled the 
interval with his division and thereafter the corps fought with a 
single line of battle. 

In the meantime the two divisions of Polk’s corps, Withers an‘ 
Cheatham, immediately on Hardee’s right, promptly advanced on 
the enemy in front and were equally as successful after desperate 
fighting, in routing the enemy at every stand they made. This 
successful fighting in front of Hardee’s and Polk’s corps was kept 
up until about three p. m., when the enemy’s right had been doubled 
back on its center so far as to be very near the Nashville turnpike. 
Hardee’s two divisions at that time occupied a position, facing the 
enemy, at an angle of about one hundred degrees from the original 
position, at the beginning of the engagenient, caused by making 
the swing to the right. 

The several brigades of Hardee’s Corps had become a good deal 
detached from each other in pursuing the enemy in their front, on 
account of the swinging nature of the movement and it became 
absolutely necessary to reform and consolidate the devisions before 
risking a further advance, for it was in evidence that the enemy 
had heavily reinforced their left for a vigorous defense of their line 
of communication. 

This required time and as the men had been fighting since day- 
hight without much food and less water, it was determined by Gen- 
eral Hardee to rest and await further orders from General Bragg. 
In the meantime the prisoners of war at the Federal field hospital 
on the Wilkerson pike had been paroled to the number of about 600 
men. ‘‘he troops bivouacked as they lay for the night. 

This conflict was about the most successful all day’s fight of 
Hardee’s command during the war. The enemy was driven back 
at least three miles as measured on the map, made from actual 
survey afterwards. As the portion of the corps fronting the enemy 
at the end of the battle was at an angle of 100 degrees of the full 
eircle from the original position of the morning, the troops must 
have travelled at least three and a half miles. 

The enemy appeared thoroughly demoralized by the fierce on- 
slaught and continued success of their opponents. Had there 
been even a fresh brigade turned loose on their disorganized masses 


18 


followed up by the detached brigades of Hardee’s corps, assisted 
by a vigorous forward movement of the troops to the right, the 
victory would have been complete and most of their artillery would 
have been captured. As it turned out no reinforcements were 
available. | 

General Hardee, as in all the battles his corps were engaged, 
was well to the front and gave personal attention to all the im- 
portant details of the day’s operation. 

The expectation at army headquarters was that. after the com- 
plete route of his right wing and right center General Rosencranz 
would withdraw his army back to Nashville either that night or 
the next day. The hope was not realized, however, and on the 
morning of January 2nd he was still “standing pat.” ° 

The extreme left of the Federal Army was located on a promi- 
nent position on the east side of Stone’s River at a point near 
which that stream was fordable. Evidently Rosencranz must have 
by this time strongly fortified his right flank that had been doubled. 
back on the first day’s fight and had to be held to protect his com- 
munications. His center and left flank west of Stone’s River was 
also strongly fortified, so that in order to force the enemy to vacate 
their lines it was necessary to seize this position on the east side of 
Stone’s River just before night, hold it and during the night to con- 
struct earth works for an infantry support and positions for a suf- 
ficient park of artillery. As batteries in this position could enfilade 
the entire left flank of the enemy and make it untenable, it was 
believed the retirement of the enemy would result. 

General Breckinridge made a careful reconnaissance of the posi- 
tion in the forenoon of January 2nd. General Brage determined 
to have the position carried by assault that evening and during the 
night strongly fortify it. Breckinridge’s division of four brigades 
with an effective total of 5,100 men was assigned to.the task. 

The assault on this position was made promptly at 4 o’clock on 
January 2nd, the position carried against a superior force and the 
enemy driven to the river bank below. At this stage a 
Federal battery of fifty-eight pieces of artillery that had been 
massed as well as masked at a point on the opposite side of the 
river that forenoon and that were completely hidden from view 
from the reconnaissance made in the forenoon by Breckinridge, were 
turned loose at a 300 or 400 yard range on that gallant division. 
Of course their could be but one result, their utter route and retreat 
to the rear to the woods in which the division had been formed 
previous to the assault. Of a force of 5,100 men taken into the 
battle, its loss in killed, wounded and missing was 1,700 men, in- 
cluding General Hanson and other valuable officers. | ! 

The result of this day’s battle, together with information ob- 


‘ 


ai 


tained from the cavalry that the enemy were receiving considerable 
reinforcements determined General Bragg to withdraw his army 
from his position in front of the enemy and retire to. the rear. 
General Rosencranz appeared to be very willing to be left alone as 
‘he did not follow his adversary. 

The campaign of 1862 ended by General Rosencranz placing his 
army into winter quarters around Murfreesboro and General Bragy 
followed his example by encamping his troops in winter quarters 
around Shelbyville and Tullahoma, within thirty and forty miles 
respectively of his adversary’s headquarters 

The campaign of 1863 opened with the crmy of Tennessee under 
Bragg occupying Shelbyville with Polk’s corps and Hardee’s corps 
of Cleyburne’s division and Breckinridge’s division, located at War- 
trace, opposite on the N. & C. Railroad. These positions could be 
turned by a flank movement of Rosencranz by the Murfreesboro and 
Manchester turnpike on Hardee’s right. 

When Rosencranz was ready for the advance in June from his 
position at Murfreesboro, he by a vigorous attack, obtained posses- 
sion of and held Hover’s Gap, an important position on that turn- 
pike, and proceeded to move in force through that pass. 

This movement on Bragg’s right compelled him to retire his two 
corps to ‘Tullahoma, where he offered battle. His adversary de- 
clined and preferred continuing the flank movement on his right. 
The Cumberland Mountain, being close in the rear, General Bragg 
determined to pass over those mountains at Sewanee and evacuate 
all of 'Tennessee westward, crossing the Tennessee River about July 
fourth and thence on to Chattanooga’s vicinity about July seventh. 
Thus three important events occurred on this date: the battle of 
Gettysburg, which though glorious to the Southern arms, necessi- 
tated the evacuation of Maryland by Lee’s Army; the surrender of 
Vicksburg with its garrison of about 20,000 prisoners with the loss 
of control of that mighty river, with all of its incalculable conse- 
quences and last the loss of the grain growing, meat producing 
State of Tennessee with its loyal people. These three events, occur- 
ring almost simultaneously, were in the nature of a calamity to the 
cause of the South. 

he surrender of the garrison of Vicksburg and their consequent 
dispersion to their homes, rendered it absolutely necessary that 
measures should be taken to collect them in some central camp, re- 
organize them and have them ready for the field as soon as they 
could be exchanged. For this important work President Davis se- 
lected Lieutenant General Hardee,and Enterprise, Mississippi, on 
the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, below Meridian, was chosen as the 
point of rendevous. Hardee at once proceeded to that point taking 
with him most of his staff and entered on his new work. 


20 


It was considered by the writer at the time as much to be re- 
gretted that this veteran corps commander should have been taken 
from the command of his old corps almost on the eve of a battle 
on the result of which so much depended. 

General Hardee successfully performed the object of his mission 
to Mississippi and was then reassigned for service with the Army. 
of Tennessee. In the meantime matters had settled down following 
the great battle of Chickamauga and movements were being made 
for the final possession of the strategic point of Chattanooga. 

Grant had succeeded to the command of the Federal Army and 
was being reinforced by Hooker’s corps from the Army of the Po- 
tomac and by Sherman’s corps of about 20,000 men marching from 
Memphis. Longstreet’s corps from the Army of Northern Virginia 
had been returned to that army through Knoxville, taking with him 
two of the best brigades from Brageg’s army. 

It is conceded unnecessary for the object of this sketch to give 
in detail the movements of the two armies leading up to the battle 
of Missionary Ridge. Lookout Mountain had been evacuated after 
a gallant fight of Walthal’s brigade against the overwhelming 
force of Hookers’ corps. Sherman had laid a pontoon bridge across 
the Tennessee River just below the mouth of Chicamauga creek, 
preparatory to an attack on the Confederate right, holding the end 
of Missionary Ridge, bordering on that creek. 

Bragg’s army occupied the crest of the ridge from the Chica- | 
mauga Creek on the right for some miles to the left. 

General Hardee commanded the right wing of the army, Cle- 
burne’s division on the extreme right, Cheatham’s division on the 
left, with Walker’s division in the center. The left (as per General 
Brageg’s report), was commanded by General Breckinridge, the con- 
stituents of whose command is not recalled. Grant’s plan, as he 
afterwards gave out, was for Hooker’s corps to move from the 
vicinity of Lookout Mountain and attack Brage’s left. Simul- 
taneously Sherman’s corps, now massed on the south side of the 
Tennessee River, was to attack Bragg’s right, held by Cleburne’s 
division on the end of Missionary Ridge, the movement on Bragg’: 
center having been intended as a feint, as that portion of the line 
appeared naturally so strong as to make success improbable. 

About noon Grant commenced marshalling his forces opposite 
the center and left of Bragg. The commanding position of Bragg’s 
- army gave a fine view of the plains below (almost devoid of timber), 
on which he was deploying his-columns for the attack. His forces 
were formed in two lines of battle just outside of artillery range 
and extended apparently for a mile each way. It ‘was a magnifi- 
cent sight long to be remembered and was in full view of Bragg’s 
depleted line of battle. 


21 


About 3:30 o’clock in the afternoon this magnificent array ad- 
vanced to the attack preceded by a heavy line of skirmishers. The 
artillery of Bragg was used with fine effect as soon as they came 
within range. Sherman’s attack on the right was stubbornly met 
by Cleburne. Again and again the attack was renewed, but always 
~ met a bloody repulse. At one time the enemy made a lodgement 
close up under Cleburne’s line, so close as to be under cover from 
his fire. It was then that a sortee was made by a part of his com- 
mand who charged down the hill and killed and captured all of 
the enemy who could not get away. ’In this attack Cleburne was 
reinforced by Maney’s and Brown’s of Cheatham’s division and 
Cummin’s brigade of Walker’s division. 

About this time General Hardee, who had been in Cleburne’s 
vicinity during the fighting, was attracted by heavy firing on the 
left of his corps. On rapidly moving to that point it was ascer- 
tained that the entire center division of the army up to the left 
of Cheatham’s division, soon followed by the entire left wing, had 
given way and were making to the rear, pell-mell. On reaching 
the top of the ridge the enemy had changed front and were moving 
down on Cheatham’s flank.’ Taking in the situation at a glance 
Cheatham caused Walthal’s brigade to form across the ridge, who 
received the enemy with such a withering fire and determined: 
front as to check their further advance. The gallant Walthat 
received a painful wound in the foot. In the midst of this fight 
Hardee came up and warmly congratulated both Cheatham and 
Walthal for their splendid work which probably saved the army 
from an utter route. Night approaching the enemy made no fur- 
ther movement on Cheatham’s flank. 

The writer desires to make this statement in behalf of the division 
in the center, that took such a panic, as soon as the enemy reached 
the foot of the hill. Ere the enemy could have made the neces- 
sarily slow climb to the top of the ridge, they could have been 
almost annihilated, had the now single line of Confederate in- 
fantry with the adequate artillery force on the flank stood firm and 
fired leisurely. To my knowledge, as the enemy was preparing to 
attack, the force on top did not form more than a single line of men, 
gees of reinforcements being sent to their left and the line nec- 

arily drawn and attenuated to that extent. 

As was fully stated by General Bragg, Hardee’s corps saved the 
army from utter route, as there were only two bridges across Chica- 
mauga River there would have been many prisoners. General Har- 
dee after nightfall slowly withdrew his corps from left to right, 
across a bridge in the rear of Cleburne’s position, the rear of the 
latter division crossing about 9 o’clock at night. The writer, under 
orders to look to the withdrawal of this division, met General Cle- 


22 


burne on that moonlight night on the levee-leading to the bridge. 
Knowing the utter route of the other wing, gloom and despondency 
enshrouded the situation. It was the first time the writer ever 
heard him give way to despondency as to the result of the cause he 
held so dear. ‘To each occurred the familiar words about “the 
silver lining to every cloud.” 

The army halted long enough at Chickamauga Station to replenish 
their supplies and retreated slowly towards .Ringold and Dalton. 
Hardee’s corps, with Cleburne’s division in the rear, brought up 
the rear. Of course the army officers and men were very gloomy 
and demoralized, but there was not as much straggling as was to 
have been expected. The bulk of the army passed Ringold on the 
evening of the 26th of November, Cleburne camping a little in 
the rear of that point. There it was learned that the enemy were 
following with a strong and over-confident force. Cleburne was 
directed to take a portion in Ringold gap just in the rear of the 
town and defend it at all hazards in order to give time for the 
artillery and baggage wagons to get out of the way. By the tinie 
the enemy made their appearance in superior force, Cleburne had 
made his dispositions for the fight. It is only necessary to state 
that Cleburne delivered battle in his usual vigorous style and that 
after an engagement that lasted five or six hours the enemy were 
repulsed with such a heavy loss that they did not renew the attack 
and the wagon trains and artillery passed on to Dalton in safety. 

For this brilhant action Cleburne and his command received the 
unusual recognition and compliment-of the thanks of the Confed- 
erate Congress and moreover the heartfelt thanks of the Confederats 
people. 

Without anv anusual happenings the army rearhed Dalton on 
November 28 and were, as fast as possible, settled down into winter 
quarters. ‘They certainly needed time for rest and recuperation 
after having recently passed through two bloody battles and the 
usual hardships of a campaign that lasted from June 1st to the 
latter date. 

Up to this date there had not been an unfavorable criticism or 
any fault found by his superior officers with the skill and ability 
exercised by Lieutenant General Hardee in the handling of his 
several commands during the memorable campaigns of 1862 and 
1863. On the contrary universal commendation. He was always 
guided by loyalty to the South and to his superior officers. He 
had always possessed the friendship, good ‘will and loyalty of the 
various division commanders who served under him Cleburne, 
Hindman, Buckner, Anderson, Cheatham, Bate, Walker and Pres- 
ton. It is believed he: possessed the confidence of ae cammand 
down to the soldier in the ranks. 


25 


General Bragg in his report of the battle of Missionary Ridge 
and the retirement to Dalton says: “Lieutenant General Hardee, as 
usual, is entitled to my warmest thanks and highest commendation 
for his gallant and judicious conduct during the whole of the trying 
scenes which we passed.” 

General Bragg at his request was relieved of the command of the 
army about December Ist and the command turned over to Lieu- 
tenant General Hardee until the arrival of General Joseph E. John- 
ston to whom was assigned the permanent command of the Army 
of ‘Tennessee: | 

At this date General Bragg retired from active command and 
did not afterwards desire or seek any further command in the 
field. It is believed by the writer that this officer has not received 
up to this time the credit due him for his military services in that 
struggle from the succeeding generations of the Southern people. 
The strictest disciplinarian in every sense, he yet possessed the 
warmest feeling for the volunteer soldier in the ranks and was in- 
clined to some extent to condone for his breach of discipline. But 
he was at the same time unrelenting in following up and punishing 
an officer for setting an example to the man in the ranks by breach 
of discipline or anv unsoldierly act. On assuming command at 
Tupelo in 1862, the soldiers considered him a tyrant for some of 
his summary acts for breachs of discipline. After the same soldiers 
had passed through battle and seen the necessity of discipline, the 
blindly obeying of orders, the same soldiers applauded acts they 
had before condemned. They learned that the safety of the cause 
and of the army depended upon every officer and soldier doing 
his duty. | 

His battles were well planned and to a certain extent victorious 
(as Murfreesboro and Chickamauga), but from various causes the 
fruits of these victories were not gathered. iad one or both these 
battles been a finished success General Bragg possessed such per- 
sonal traits of character as would have made him the idol of his 
army. 

The campaign of 1864 in the west opened with General J. E. 
Johnston at Dalton with an army of something less than 40,000 
ae infantry and artillery (effective total). General W. T. 

erman confronted him with an army of 98,000 men of all arms 
located around Chattanooga or within close call of that point. Gen- 
eral Sherman reports his army was kept up to this strength by 
reinforcements during the coming campaign. 

The results of the campaign of 1863 was calculated to have a 
very depressing and despondent effect on the rank and file of the 
army and such was the case. Where trees were convenient the 
several divisions built rough log cabins for shelter and soon made 


24 


themselves more comfortable. It is recalled that early in the 
winter there commenced a religious revival that passed througn 
most of the divisions. , 

The assignment of General Joseph E. Johnston had a manifest- 
ing effect in restoring confidence and the morale of the troops. 
Underlying all was the devotion to the justice of the cause we were 
all engaged in. General Hardee, for several months in command, 
was alive to the good policy of amusing and occupying the minds 
of the troops by a system of drills, parades and reviews. It is re- 
called a general review of the entire army was made, Cheatham 
being in command of his corps. All these combination of events 
had a fine effect in almost completely restoring its old esprit du 
corps and morale. 

The following statement of conditions shows that there was 
need at once for all this patriotism and restcred confidence. It will 
be recalled that the first year’s enlistment of the entire Confederate 
army expired in the spring of 1862. The entire weste-1 army at 
Corinth re-enlisted for two mcre years. That period xvas about to 
expire at Dalton in the spring of 1864. 

There was much anxiety at Richmond as well as among the 
higher officers of the Army of Tennessee as to the next happen- 
ings.. Although they would be held by the Conscript law, passed 
nearly two years before, yet it was felt that if the men in the 
ranks were held against their will it would be in the nature of a 
disaster. 

Suddenly the superb patriotism of the men in the ranks of the 
army presented a solution of the difficulty. To the glory and 
honor of the Tennessee troops this movement commenced in Co. A 
Sixth and Ninth Tennessee, Col. George C. Porter. It spread 
to the regiment until that entire brigade, Maney’s, met in mass 
meeting, passed patriotic resolution, and re-enlisted for the war. On 
being published, it took lke “wild fire,” first through the several 
brigades of Cheathams division and consecutively through every 
brigade of the army, even extending to every command of the Con- 
federate army. (For particulars see Appendix B.) _ 

Well might Senator Hill of Georgia exclaim on the floor of the 
Confederate Senate “All honor to the Tennesseans.” 

This movement that only required a “starter,” relieved the load 
of anxiety existing in high quarters at Richmond as well as among 
all the higher officers of the army and produced that high confi- 
dence among the rank and file so necessary at the beginning of a 
campaign so frought with good or ill to the Southern cause. 

The campaign of 1864 in the west opened with General J. EH. 
Johnston at Dalton with an army of something less than an effec- 
tive total of 40,000 infantry and artillery. General W. T. Sherman 


25 


confronted him ‘with an army of 98,000 men of all arms, located 
around Chatanooga or within easy call of that point. He reports his 
army was kept up to that strength by reinforcements during the 
coming campaign. 

The confidence and good will of the army in their General-in- 
Chief increased as the months passed. His force being less than one 
half of that of his adversary, his plan of campaign strictly adhered 
to, was to force his adversary to attack him when covered by field 
works, He saved his men as much as possible by the avoidance of 
foolish and unnecessary charging breastworks. 

The commissary and quartermaster department were well organ- 
ized. The ration of one half pound of smoked bacon with one and a 
quarter pounds of corn meal with equivalent in other cereals, ome- 

), was distributed with regularity. No sugar, coffee, 
no nothing else! This ration was scant, but it was supplemented 
by the patriotic action of the people of Georgia who freely offered 
all their green apples, vegetables and fields of sorghum. The writer 
saw many fields of sorghum disappear, the remnants being scai- 
tered along the line of march in the shape of the chewed up pith. 

The camp equipage was equally as scant. One wagon for each 
regiment for cooking utensils and entrenching tools, tent-flys for all 
officers. Notwithstanding the above scant commissary and quarter- 
master stores this army was never in better health physically, more 
vigorous and in better trim for fight, not excepting during the 
Kentucky campaign. heir faith in having all their wants looked 
after and supplied and their knowledge that they would not be un- 
necessarily and foolishly exposed in battle, caused the rank and 
file of the army to have full confidence in their chief and to nerve 
them to do their full duty whenever he turned them loose on the 
enemy. ‘The same spirit of confidence pervaded the entire army 
from corps commanders down to the man with the musket. The 
corps division and brigade commanders were never more in har- 
mony and loyal to their chief. This unity told in battle for in 
every instance in which these forces clashed Sherman’s forces were 
usually worsted. 

The tacties of General Sherman were necessarily the opposite of 
Johnston’s. He was placed there to advance into his enemy's 
country and was given an army commensurate with the job, two to 
one in strength. After finding’ out from sad experiences the 
impolicy of attacking his enemy in fortified works, he settled down 
to the slower plan of pushing his lines by superior force, cloce up to 
his adversaries works (causing at times severe engagements), and 
fortifying strongly. When sufficiently fortified, with a large force 
he moved on one of his adyersary’s flanks and gaan him to vacate 
his ti In the mean time Johnston anticipating such tactics 


26. 


had selected the next naturally strong position in the rear, marked 
it out for each division, would then vacate the late position about 9 
o’clock at night and by the time his adversary appeared in front had - 
sufficiently entrenched himself to receive him. | 

After crossing the Etowah River the. Fedeial commander followed 
these general tactics, charging one time to his cost in the assault 
on the left of the Kennesiw line, hereafter to be noticed. 

This general sketch of the tactics of the Generals-in-Chief of 
these two armies are given to render unnecessary the details of their 
several movements from Dalton to the crossing of the Chatta- 
hoochee. , 

Sherman’s advance commenced about May Ist, his frst movement 
being to pass his army through Snake Creek Gap i in the high range 
of hills behind which Johnstcn’s army was encamped at Dalton. 
This movement threatening Johnston’s rear at Resaca, at the cross- 
ing of the Estinaula River, caused him to retire to that point and 
confront his adversary behind fortified works, already constructed. 
Sherman made several determined efforts to carry the most salient 
of these works, but was always vigorously repulsed with propor- 
tionate loss. 

This forced Sherman to use his much superior force by a flank 
move, crossing the Estinaula below Resaca, threatening his oppo- 
nent’s rear and causing the evacuation of that point and the retiring 
towards Kingston and later to the open country in the vicinity of 
Cassville. At this point Johnston took up a strong position, deter- 
mined to deliver battle to his adversary when he developed in 
front, going so far as to issue a battle order. Governor J. D. Porter 
then of Cheatham’s staff writes in volume eight of Confederate His- 
tory: “Hardee reported his troops were wild with enthusiasm and 
delight.” The position was well chosen and-the best occupied dur- 
ing the campaign, but according to General Johnston’s report, Polk 
and Hlood were unwilling to risk a battle there claiming that a 
part of Polk’s line was enfiladed by the enemy’s artillery and urged 
Johnston to abandon the place and cross the Etowah River. Har- . 
dee, though not so favorably posted, remonstrated against the 
change. General’ Johnston yielded his better judgment and lost 
his best opportunity and at daylight on May 20th reluctantly crossed 
the Etowah.” 

Johnston slowly fell back before his superior adversary, - occa- 
‘sionally fortifying and receiving attack. The first important posi- 
tion fortified was what was known ‘as the New Hope Church line, 
where in a preliminary fight, Cleburne’s division. administered a 
bloody repulse to a superior force of the enemy. Sherman: finally 
by superior numbers closed up and: fortified a ne immediately in 
front of the New Hope position. Finally, despairing of piercing 


at 


his adversary’s position in front, he made a movement in such 
‘force on Johnston’s right flank that caused him to evacuate his 
strong position and fall back to a line in which Pine Mountain was 
a prominent point. On this mountain General Polk was killed by 
a stray shell on the 14th of June. Sherman continuing his flan 
movement caused Johnston to fall back to a line several miles in 
front of Kennesaw Mountain and finally in the latter part of June, 
after some sharp fighting, to what was called the ‘Kennesaw line,” 
with that mountain forming Johnston’s right. 

After each of these changes of position there was more or less 
fighting between detachments in which the Confederates either held 
their own or administered severe punishment to their adversaries. 
At this time, June 24th, General Sherman (see his report), deter- 
mined to assault Johnston’s left and left centre fortified lines in 
order to convince his“army that his heretofore system of tactics 
by superior force flanking his adversary to the rear, was not always 
to be followed. Accordingly this assault was made on the 27th of 
June. Johnston’s lines extended from the right of Kennesaw 
Mpuntain the length of two corps’ fronts to the left on very advan- 
tageous ground and by this time was well protected by field work. 
Hardee’s corps occupied the extreme left, Cheatham’s division on 
the left, then Cleburne’s, then Bates’, then Walker’s. The line on 
the extreme left had an angle to the left of about 75 degrees with 
the main line. Cheatham’s division wrapped around this angle 
(afterwards called the “Dead Angle”) about one half brigade 
length. 

As soon as Sherman’s army came in touch with his adversary, he 

vigorously pushed his lines close up to his line and strongly fortified 
it, evidently having in view the assault determined upon. At the 
predetermined time Sherman delivered the assault (after making a 
demonstration on the entire line) the full force of the blow being 
dealt on Cheatham’s entire front and on Cleburne’s left. Al- 
though the assaulting columns were much superior in numbers they 
were vigorously repulsed at all points. The attack on the “Dead 
Angle” was several times repeated and was so determined and 
furious that it was said a color bearer planted his colors on the 
ee A number of their dead lay within 100 feet of the 
Aine in an open space. It was necessary to bury these gallant fel- 
lows under a flag of truce a few days subsequent. 

In front of Lowry’s brigade of Cleburne the enemy charged 
through open woods to within fifty yards of his works leaving many 
dead and wounded as they fell. Just then last year’s dead grass 
and brush caught fire from the enemy’s musketry fire and was rap- 
idly spreading among the dead and wounded. As soon as discov- 
ered, a white flag was displayed by Lowry’s men, unarmed men from 


28 


each side gathered spontaneously and quickly and tenderly moved 
the dead and wounded to the Federal lines. Then the firing was 
resumed. Such incidents are among the few bright spots on wari. 
rugger front, yet it was capable of being repeated by any brigade of 
the Grand Army of Tennessee. 

General Sherman, as was doubtless his army, was satisfied of the 
utility of his new policy of direct assault on his adversaries forti- 
fied lines and resorted to his old tactics of threatening his enemy’s 
rear by superior numbers and thus “shewing” him to the rear. 

Johnston, by thus threatening his rear with no opportunity to 
strike back, was thus forced to evacuate his strongly fortified Ken- 
nesaw line and fall back to a previously sclected line.at “Symrna 
Church” a few miles south of Marietta. After some sharp fighting 
on that. line he retired to a line previously fortified by the labor 
from the Georgia plantations which was an enlarged “Tete du pont” 
with each flank resting on the Chattahoochee river and extensive 
enough for the entire army. It was a very strong line 
well adopted for the army to retire across the stream if pushed . 
but as it did not cover a good crossing of that stream a few miles 
above, Sherman did not pay much attention to it and did not close 
his lines around it as was usual with him. After a thorough re- 
connaissance he determined to cross his army at once, at the cross- 
ing a few miles above his adversary’s right flank, just mentioned 
on the road leading to Decatur and Atlanta. After making a lodg- 
ment on the south side, he commenced moving over his entire army. 
As soon as this plan was sufficiently develcped Johnston promptly 
withdrew his army across the Chattahoochee and bivouacked on 
the 9th of July, enmasse, awaiting the enemy’s movements. As 
soon as it was developed that Sherman’s entire army was crossing, 
he selected a position covering Atlanta on the south side of Peach- 
tree Creek and partially fortified it. 

At this date, July 18, an order came from the War Department 
at Richmond, relieving General Johnston of the command of the 
army, with instructions, for General I. B. Hood, promoted to the 
rank of general, to assume command. As all the preliminaries 
had been made for an attack on Sherman’s army, as soon as it 
could be delivered, the three corps commanders, Hardee, Hood and 
Stewart, joined in a telegram, urging that the change in com- . 
manders, should not be made until after the impending battle. 
It did not avail and General Hood at once assumed command. 

It may be in order to take in review the movements of these 
two armies in that celebrated campaign. With a finely equipped 
army at all times double in strength to that of his adversary, it 
has always occurred to the writer that had Sherman. possessed the 
military genius attributed to him by his admirers, he should have 


29 


practically destroyed Johnston’s army before reaching the Chatta- 
hoochee. 

The writer is not fidtitiae with the topography of the country 
north of the Etowah river for reasons given on Appendix A., 
but is more or less familiar with the comparatively open country 
south of the New Hope Church line. That country by its numerous 
roads and its open character was well adapted to the movement 
of large bodies of troops. 

The troops.of each army were Veterans and behind fortified 
works may be considered equal, man for man. Take an example--. 
Johnston in falling back usually occupied the next good position, 
already selected and soon covered his command by strong field 
work. Sherman comes up and after proper reconnaissance, pushed 
his line up close to that of his adversary’s and covers his command 
with equally as strong field works. Admitting Johnston’s force 
as forty thousand effective, it will require Sherman to oppose him 
in trenches with forty thousand men. He has then an army of 
forty thousand men in reserve. There would be very little risk 
in making a night march with even thirty thousand of this reserve 
around to the flank and rear, and delivering a vigorous attack at 
daylight, on his flank and rear. Ordinarily such a movement 
vigorously made would result in a disaster to his adversary. ‘To 
meet this rear attack Johnston would be compelled to withdraw 
a part or all of his troops from their entrenched line, Sherman’s 
entrenched line would then advance and between the flank and rear 
attack, it would ordinarily result in a rout of his adversary’s army. 
By a daylight attack there would be time enough to practically 
finish the job before night. 

The Kennesaw line offered an admirable opportunity for such 
a movement, as the country in Johnston’s front and left flank was 
by its topography suitable, but instead of making the movement 
with the large force at his command, it was made with a force 
inadequate to the job and instead of an attack in rear the attack 
was made against a strongly fortified line in front and flank 
and of course was a failure. 

With his force, usually one-half of.that of his adversary General. 
ohnston’s tactics were necessarily of a defensive character. His 
object was therefore to force his adversary to attack his forces 
when in a fortified position, as detailed heretofore. In carrying 
through this policy he was most successful, inflicting losses on his 
adversary, more than in proportion to the difference in the size 
of the respective armies. 

Most certainly General Johnston retrograde movement from 
Dalton to Atlanta was wonderfully successful. There was not, in 
the evacuation of the many fortified lines, the loss of a single piece 


30 


of light artillery or the leaving behind a single sick or wounded 
soldier in that nearly three months of almost continual daily fight- 
ing. In all the battles in which detachments of his army were 
engaged they either inflicted bloody repulses or held their own. 

No wonder General Johnston possessed the confidence and loyalty 
of his army from. corps commanders to the man with the musket. 
No wonder this army was filled with grief and despondeucy when 
it was announced that its command was transferred from such an 
officer to an officer they knew little about, except as a gallant 
division commander of another army. 

In the long and arduous campaign, a sketch of which has just 
been given, Hardee’s corps received and gave back many haid 
knocks. In all the detached engagements in which its several 
divisions took part, the well earned reputation of the corps was 
fully sustained, the most important of which was the assault ox 
the Keenesaw line, heretofore ‘described. 

There had been at all times perfect harmony and confidence 
between. General Hardee and the’ General-in-Chief which found 
expression in frequent commendation of the judicious services of ° 
the former, in the management of his corps. 

After General Hood assumed command the army mae the 
line selected by General Johnston, on Peach Tree Creek, before 
alluded to. Hardee’s corps on the right with Stewart’s corps on 
the left. Still further to the right was stationed Cheatham’s 
corps (formerly Hood’s), but with an interval of about a geet 
from Hardee’s right. 

Bate’s division formed the right of the corps; Walker’s divietent 
in the center; Cheatham’s division commanded by Mlaney, on the 
left; and Cleburne’s division as a reserve in the rear of Walker. 
As in most battles .the attacking force does not move forward at . 
the hour fixed upon and instead of one o’clock it was about four 
o'clock p. m. The enemy’s line having a curved front Walker’s 
division came into action first and was decisively repulsed by the 
enemy’s fortified lines. Bate on account of dense brush in his 
line of march did not get into position for the attack until just 
before he ascertained from the writer, that Walker’s division, on 
his left, had been repulsed, when the division was halted, as a 
further advanee would only have caused useless slaughter. The 
writer was personally cognizant of the difficulties encountered 
in the advance of the division as he had made, in the forenoon, 
a personal reconnaissance of the ground and was ordered by Hardee 
to accompany and give direction to its line of advance. To those 
acquainted with the energetic activity of General Bate these details 


are not necessary, but are given as one of the records of the day’s 
fight. 


ol 


After Walker’s repulse Cleburne’s division was ordered to ad- 
vance and renew the assault. Bate’s division was then ready to 
co-operate. At this time a peremptory order came from General 
Hood for Hardee to send him a division to repel a threatened 
attack on the enemy on the extreme right of the Confederate line. 
Cleburne’s division was the only one available and instead of 
making the assault, on the point of being delivered, it was with- 
drawn from the line of battle and sent two or three miles to the 
right rear. ‘These details are given to account for any apparent 
delay in General Bate’s division. Of course no further attack was 
made before night. At the time Hardee received the peremptory 
order for a division to be sent him General Hood was two or three 
miles to the rear and could not be communicated with and the 
situation explained to him (see the officiai reports of Hardee and 
Cleburne) and the peremptory character of Hood’s order necessi- 
tated the sending off at a critical moment Cleburne’s division. 

On July 21st, General Hood planned an attack on Sherman’s 
left flank and rear and selected Hardee’s corps for the movement. 
This corps was by a night march by a circuitous route, to obtain 
a position on the enemy’s left flank and rear and make an attack 
in the early morning. All night marches are necessarily slow and 
wearisome, to infantry. They must have t'me to rest, time to eat, 
and if possible time for a nap before going into battle. It-is muca 
easier to give an order for expeditious movements, than to execute 
them. That wearisome night march was no exception to the rule; 
the more wearisome than usual because this corps had been march- 
ing and fighting for thirty-six hours before this movement and it 
did not get into position and line up for the advance befsre 12:30 
p. m. of July 22nd. 

The extreme left of the Federal line made an angle with its main 

_ line, for nearly one half of a mile from its end on the McDonough 
road. At the McDonough road it was refused back at right angle 
to the road for a length sufficient for positions for a battery of 
artillery and its support. 

All this face of the Federal line had been well fortified by sub- 
stantial earth work. 

' The line of battle was as follows :— 

/ Cleburne’s division was formed with its left resting on the 
McDonough road, extending two brigade fronts to the right, 
Lowry’s brigade in reserve. On the left of Cleburne’s division was 
formed Cheatham’s division, General Maney commanding with its 
right on the McDonough road. 
~ On the right of Cleburne was formed Walker’s division, and still 
farther to the right was formed Bate’s division on the extreme right 
of the corps. 


32 


In front of Bate and Walker and to a some lesser extent, in 
front of Cheatham and Cleburne, the advance was made through 
a thick oak brush (sometimes so thick as to prevent vision for more 
than fifty yards), which impeded the infantry very much and made 
it difficult and slow to keep up the alignment. Furthermore, in | 
front of Bate was a large mill pond, so close to the Federal picket 
lines, as to have prevented its location being known with any exact- 
ness. ‘his obstruction in front of Bate’s division required addi- 
tional time in passing around it. 

From the preceding description of the formation of the oppos- 
ing lines, it will appear that in front of Cheatham’s division and 
Cleburne’s division were well fortified lines of entrenchments. It 
will, moreover, appear that one brigade front of Cleburne and the 
full division fronts of Walker and Bate’s division were directly 
in the rear of the Federal lines. These details are given in answer 
to the charge of General Hood, that General Hardee had not obeyed 
his orders in making an attack in the rear.as well as on his flank. 
The position of Cheatham’s division was the correct one, for had it 
been placed to the right of Bate’s division, it would have Jeft open 
an unobstructed route to the streets of Atlanta. As proof that 
one of Cleburne’s brigades (Polk’s) made a rear attack, is the 
fact that General McPherson of the Federal army, was killed by 
the advance line of this brigade. 

The writer from personal knowledge of the battlefield on that 
day, is confident the above statement in regard to the positions of 
the divisions of Cleburne, Walker and Bate are substantially correct. 

From the foregoing sketch of this battlefield it will appear, 
why the division of Cheatham and Cleburne, struck the enemy’s 
line first, as it was slightly salient. 

It is evident that the divisions of Cleburne and Cheatham would 
have the brunt of the battle to bear today. They would first 
come in contact with the enemy and would then have that fortified 
line to assault. 

These divisions, in every battle in which they had heretofore been 
engaged had registered their deeds high on the scroll of fame for 
valor and all soldierly qualities and in all respects had proved 
themselves the peer of any division of the entire Confederate 
Army. They sustained their well earned reputation in today’s 
battle. 

On coming into contact with the enemy’s lines they made their 
usually vigorous onslaught that in the end carried ev erything 
before them. 

After several hours’ fighting the two divisions had swept over 
the enemy’s fortified lines for a distance of five hundred yards 
from the end, capturing eight (8) pieces of field artillery and a 


33 


good many prisoners. This success was, however, gained at the 
expense of heavy loss in killed and wounded. 

. For reasons given Walker’s division did not come into action, 
along with Cleburne’s division on his left. The latter's attack 
aroused the enemy and by the time Walker’s was brought into 
action, a force had been shifted to confront him, large enough to 
check his advance. 

General Bate, for reasons heretofore given, did not get into 
action as soon as Walker, giving still longer time for the enemy to 
confront him with a superior force. Eacn of these divisions held 
their positions for the remainder of the dav. | 

In this day’s battle at the frent line of his division Major-Genera! 
W. IT. Walker fell, one of the heroes of the Mexican War, in one 
of whose engagements he had been desperately wounded. He was 
still hale and hearty and on the battlefield was enspired with the 
fire of youth. 

Very close to the position where General Walker fell, Major- 
General McPherson, commanding a corps of the Federal army, 
was mortally wounded. He had many admirers among the Southern 
soldiers, because he made no war on non-combatants. He always 
bore himself as a soldier and a gentlemen. 

Although the flank movement of this corps was not, as decided 
a success as was hoped for, yet it was a decided victory and the only 
victory acheived by the army when under General Hood’s command. 
lts fruits, on the second day, was the evacuation of their lines by 

_ the enemy for about one mile (as far as the Augusta railroad) and 
the abandonment of Sherman’s plans to extend his lines any 
farther to the Confederate right. 

General Sherman, checked on that flank, commenced extending 
his right towards East Point, the junction of the road to Macon 
and the railroad line toward Montgomery, Alabama, the latter 
line having already been cut by the enemy. His plan was, 
evidently, to get possession of the only source of supply of Hood’s 
army and thus force the evacuation of Atlanta. Lieutenant-Genera! 
S. D. Lee’s corps was advanced to check this movement, but met 
with a decided repulse on the 28th of July. The Confederate 

ortified line was gradually extended on their left flank to cover 

Ahis railroad. At the proper time Hardee’s corps was transferred 
from the Confederate right to the left of Lee’s corps to meet this 
extension of the enemy’s right. This caused several engagements 
with parts of the corps. One particularly is recalled, with Bate’s 
division, in which the enemy was severely punished. 

On September 30th Hardee’s left had reached a point several 
miles south of East Point. In the afternoon of that day the 


34 


writer was despatched to the front (to the west) to ascertain if 
possible, the enemy’s movements and design. 

Moving cautiously outside of our cavalry pickets he found a 
position in plain view, through the trees of a well worn public 
highway leading in the direction of Jonesborough, a railroad 
station on the road to Macon, Ga., about twenty-two miles from 
East Point. Just across the road, to the right was the usual smoke 
and the “hum” of the camp of a large body of infantry, probably 
a division. Along the road were the evidence of a battery of 
artillery having passed and the usual “stragglers” following a 
large column of infantry. This information was sent by a courier 
to General Hardee, in a written communication, the writer re- 
maining for further observation. 

On the return to camp he learned that General Hardee had 
acted on his information, had communicated with General Hood 
and had been ordered by him to start his own corps, with Lee’s 
corps, to Jonesborough by a night march, he to precede them by 
rail, as soon as possible, and with the two corps attack the enemy 
and drive them off. 

Cleburne in command of Hardee’s corps followed by Lee’s corps, 
at once commenced the movement. After night fall, when near- 
ing Jonesborough, the head of the corps found the enemy in 
possession of the line of march. Cleburne at once dispatched the 
writer to Rough and Ready Station several miles to the rear, to 
communicate with General Hood, inform him of the situation and 
obtain further orders. 

On account of the road being full of haat: and a dark night 
it was about eight o’clock at night before that point was reached 
and communication with General Hood opened by telegraph. He 
replied that General Hardee was in Jonesborough—General Cle- 
burne had found a route around the Federals and that the two 
corps were enroute to Jonesborough. 

On account of the delay occasioned by this detour Hardee’s 
corps did not get into position before nine o’clock a. m. on the 
thirty-first of August; and Lee’s corps not until eleven o’clock a. 
m. <A portion of Lee’s corps left on picket did not arrive till 
one thirty p. m. 

As it developed Sherman’s entire force was in supporting distance 
of Jonesborough, except Slocum’s corps left to threaten At'anta. 

The attack was not commenced until abcut three o’clock, p. m. 
Lee’s corps on the right. This latter corps encountered a superior 
well entrenched force and was repulsed with- heavy loss, that 
splendid soldier and gentleman Patton Anderson commanding a 
division receiving a fearful wound in the face. Cleburne was mors 
fortunate, made a considerable forward movement encountering 


3D 


several lines of battle. As the attack of Lee was not a success, 
Cleburne was drawn back to his original position; Lee occupying 
his original position. 

On the night of August 31st General Hardee received a written 
order from General Hood directing him to send to him at Atlanta, 
Lee’s corps, to be started at two o’clock a. m., of September Ist, as 
the indications were that Atlanta would be attacked on the ist of 
September. This corps was promptly started on time, leaving 
Hiardee’s corps to confront an enemy that had repulsed the attack 
of the two corps the day before. This corps was, early on the first 
of September, extended in its formation to cover the front of the 
two corps and was weakened to that extent. 

It is most ‘extraordinary that General Hood, after giving posi- 
tive orders to Hardee to attack the enemy in front of Jonesborough 
on the 3ist of August, should on the evening of that day, before 
knowing the result of that day’s fight, send another ek Ha 
order “to send him Lee’s corps, one- half of his force, starting it 
that night. As telegraphic communication had been severed the 
dav before, there was no other alternative but to obey. 

Sherman, after feeling Hardee’s position in the forenoon of 
September 2nd, in the afternoon, concentrated an attack on the 
extreme right of the corps, attacking Govan’s brigade of Cleburne’s 
division in such overwhelming force, as to practically “run 
over” that gallant brigade capturing about six hundred, among them 
that superb soldier, himself General Govan. Fortunately Gordon’s 
brigade of Cheatham’s division had been brought from the left; 
was promptly formed to retake the position captur ed and bya gallant 
charge, not only checked the further advance of the enemy but 
gained a part of the line lost. Fortunately night was approaching 
and the enemy did not take advantage of their superior force and 
follow up their success. 

Single-handed this corps, by hard fighting, kept at bay four or 
five corps of the enemy. Hardee realized this was necessary to make 
- possible the successful evacuation of Atlanta, which, a soldier’s 
forethought taught him, was at hand. 

Against such overwhelming odds Hardee realized there was only 
one recourse left him, the withdrawal of his corps under cover of 
laa four miles in the rear, to a position covering Lovejoy’s 
Station. About nine o’clock at night whilst on this retrograde 
movement, a dull long-drawn-out roar was heard in the direction 
of Atlanta that announced the last act in its evacuation, the burn- 
ing and destruction of about thirty car loads of ammunition and 
other ordinance stores. The explosion was very distinctly heard. 

Hardee’s corps was moved without molestation back to Lovejoy’s 
Station, formed in line, selected and partially entrenched, before 


36 


the advance of Sherman appeared in front about nine o’clock the 
next morning, September 2nd. Their first attack was made and 
repulsed. Soon afterwards, without any apparent reason, the force 
in front was withdrawn back to the main body and Sherman with- 
drew his army back to Atlanta. After getting positive informa- 
tion of its evacuation he ‘was satisfied with having * ‘won the cam- 
paign,” so he stated at the time. 

Had the Federal commander possessed the military genius with 
which he was accredited, it should have been displayed in vigor- 
ously following up his success, either in following Hardee that 
morning, overwhelmed him by his superior forces or turned towards 
Atlanta and crushed Lee’s corps and then Stewart’s corps in detail. 
Instead of that he announced “the campaign won’* and quietly 
retired back to Atlanta. 

It is not considered best at this day, to enter into the details of 
the controversy between Hardee and Hood as to the responsibility 
for the failure of the military movements leading to the fall of 
Atlanta. Public opinion has pretty well settled down as to that 
question. It is believed to be conceded that Hood was Jacking in 
that noble trait of character possessed by the great Lee, to a 
remarkable extent; that trait caused him to frankly acknowledge 
full responsibility for his own acts and not to lay blame on his sub- 
ordinates. He even went further and sometimes assumed re- 
sponsibility for failure of his subordinates. “It was all my fault, 
soldiers.” This trait did not decrease the confidence and love of 
his army, but rather the contrary. 

The details of the battles of July 20th and 22nd are given from 
the personal knowledge of the writer, merely consulting published 
records as to dates, at times. Those details controvert General 
Hood’s charge, of disobedience of orders and want of proper 
energy in movements. In criticising Harcee’s acts, he insinuates, 
though he does not charge, that Hardee “kicked and pulled back,” 
so as to produce failures in movements, merely to spite him, Hood; 
in other words, charging him with disloyalty to that cause for 
which he cherished the highest love, for which those who knew 
never entertained the remotest doubt. 

This criticism of the battle of July 22nd was made by the writer 
at that time. This plan was for the corps commanded by Cheatham 
occupying the entrenched line in Atlanta, opposite the Federal 
left, to have attacked it in front as soon as Hardee’s corps was 
vigorously engaged. This movement of Cheatham’s corps directly, 
under the eye of the Commanding General, was made soon after 
Cleburne commenced his attack and was made too soon and was 
repulsed before Hardee’s corps was well engaged. Hod, under 


37 


whose eye the attack was made, is responsible for the premature 
attack. . 

It is understood General Hood does not find fault with General 
Hardee, as to the two days’ fighting around Jonesborough, but the 
following dispatch to General Bragg indicates he places the failure 
on the men in the ranks, in the fight of August 31st. (See Volume 
VIII of Confederate History, page 142). The dispatch reading: 

“To let you know what a disgraceful fight our men made on August 
31st, | give you the wounded in the two corps; Hardee’s 539— 
Lee's 946. Killed, a very small number.” 

It would seem almost impossible (but for the high authority 
just quoted) that General Hood should have registered such 4 
charge against the Veterans of Cheatham, of Cleburne, of Bate 
and Walker, and the Veterans of Lee’s corps, after the records 
these veterans had written in blood on the pages of history, since 
Hood had succeeded to the command, on July 18. 

This record taken from official sources reads: Killed, 1756: 
wounded, 10,267; total killed and wounded, 12,023. Time 45 days 
or six weeks. 

Casualties from May 1, to July 18, during which General John- 
ston commanded the army: Killed, 1221; wounded, 8299; totai 
for 79 days or two and two-thirds months, 9520. 

What was the result of this six weeks of offensive campaign, as 
compared to Johnston’s defensive plan. Answer. ‘The loss of 
Atlanta; the loss of 12,000 gallant soldiers; the destruction of the 
previous high morals of this army and their utter loss of confidence 
in the military skill of the Commander-in-Chief. This was in 
evidence, on the review of Hardee’s. corps by the President, Generai 
Hardee and General Cheatham at Palmetto, when as they passed 
in front of one of the brigades of the latter’s division, men cried 
out, “Give us back Johnston” repeatedly several times. ‘The writer 
witnessed the incident. | 

In the fore part of this paper it is asserted that in all the 
battles of Hardee’s corps when under his command, it never turned 
its back to the enemy, from Shiloh to the battles resulting in the 
fall of Atlanta, up to July 18, 1863. That assertion has been 
substantiated. On Julv 20th Walker’s division alone was re- 
pulsed. On July 22nd the entire corps went forward and held 
its ground to the end. On August 31st Lee’s corps could ‘not 
accomplish impossibilities. Hardee’s corps was successful until 
retired after Lee’s repulse. On the 2nd of September Hardee’s 
corps, single-handed, held its lines till night. 

As heretofore noted the evacuation of Atlanta resulted in the 
loss of about thirty (30) carloads of ammunition and other ordi- 
nance stores. This train had been ordered as far as East Point 


38 


(there to await further orders) in ample time for its movement 
to a safe point farther South, but it appeared to have been for- 
gotten by the officers responsible for its movement and when they 
awakened to the situation, it was too late, as the enemy had control 
of the railroad near Rough and Ready Station. This train was 
then moved to Atlanta and on its evacuation.on the evening of 
September 1st, it was fired and destroyed causing the explosion | 
that was heard on retiring from Jonesborough. 

As this ammunition was of almost incalcuable value to the Con- 
federacy General Hood caused the matter to be investigated to 
determine which of his subordinate officers were responsible for this 
loss. 

The following facts were elicited: General Hood had, through 
his chief of staff, given orders to the quartermaster in charge in 
ample time for its safe passage to the rear. It had been started 
and reached Kast Point there to await orders, as the enemy’s move- 
ments were then uncertain. It then appeared to have been forgotten 
by the quartermaster in charge until the line to Macon had been 
closed by the enemy. ‘The responsibility was thrown directly on 
the quartermaster, but at the same time the chief of staff was 
blamed, because he did not, through his staff, follow up the order 
until he knew it had been fulfilled. | 

Whilst the foregoing decisions were correct it did not free the 
commanding general from responsibility, fer it was his duty, to an 
authority higher up, the President and people of the Confederacy, 
to have followed up his order through his staff officers until he 
knew such an important order was fully executed, if possible to 
be done. This was the usual custom of General Johnston, General’ 
Bragg and General Hardee. 

This incident of the loss of the ammunition train is closely 
paralled by the controversy as to whether General Cheatham or 
who, was responsible for the failure to attack Schofield’s corps as 
it passed at night on the Turnpike toward Franklin on Nov. 29th? 
Supposing the order was transmitted to Cheatham, of which there 
appears doubt, it was still paramount duty of the Commander- 
in-Chief, to ascertain that such an important order as a night 
attack, had been carried out before going to sleep. Subsequently 
after a full investigation the controversy ended by General Hood 
writing a frank and manly letter to General Cheatham exonorat- 
ing him from all blame. A similar letter was written General 
_ Stewart the only other corps commander connected with the move- 
ment. Then it would appear that no one ‘was to blame. (Affi- 
davits, see Volume VITT. Confederate Military History, page 153— 
also Battle Sketches by B. L. Ridley, page 436). 

After the evacuation of Atlanta Stewart’s corps and Lee’s corps 


oo 


made a successful junction with Hardee’s corps at Lovejoy’s 
Station, but after the withdrawal of the enemy to Jonesborough 
‘and later to the former city. 

Whilst the army was resting at this place, after a campaign, with 
almost daily fighting, for about six weeks, Sherman notified General 
Hood that he purposed the depopulation of Atlanta, for military 
reasons, and that he must prepare to receive all the old men, 
women and children that chose to go South. Against the sturdy 
protest of Hood he proceeded to carry out this inhuman and 
unnecessary order until its final completion. This whole proceed- 
ing was only equaled in inherent savagery, by a previous pro- 
ceeding of this representative of a great government in loading 
into freight cars about 500 old men, women and children, the 
operatives of the cotton factory at Rosewell, Georgia sending them 
to Louisville, Kentucky, and turning them loose in a large city 
without money, food and bedding. Some of these children were 
found by their parents in Vermont after the war, and some never 
returned to their mothers. 

On the 18th and 19th of September this army was transferred 
to Palmetto Station on the railroad line from Atlanta to Mont- 
gomery, preparatory, as afterwards developed, to the campaign 
into Tennessee in Sherman’s rear. 

During its halt here of ten days President Davis made a short 
visit. It was well known that Lieutenant General Hardee was un- 
willing to serve under General Hood because he believed him, 
though a tried and gallant officer, to be unequal in both experience 
and natural ability to so important a command. Since then Gen- 
eral Hood had endeavored in his reports of operations around Atw 
lanta to unload on to him the failures due to Hood’s own blunders. 
This rendered his farther service under Hood impossible. The 
President must have recognized this and assented to his relief of 
the command of his old corps with great reluctance saying: “My. 
assent to his persistent request to be relieved was finally given 
because of irreconceivable differences between himself and the 
officer commanding-in-chief.” | y 

He was then given command of “The Department of South 
Carolina, Georgia and Florida.” He was allowed to take with him 

his new command a good many of his old staff, the writer among 
them. He left at once for Charleston, 8. C., his future headquar- 
ters, arriving there on October 5th. 

General Hardee’s new command was a very extensive one in area, 
but with only two important seaports, Charleston, S. C., and Savan- 
nah, Ga., around which were grouped most of the troops in the de- 
partment. Charleston was the most important on account of its 
being a “blockade running” port, a line of light draught (six feet) 


40 


steamers up to its evacuation on February 18th making regular 
and. successful trips to the British port of New Providence Island. 
This in spite of the close blockade by the Federal fleet. 

Florida though of no strategic importance yet otherwise of very 
great importance because its “hammock” lands furnished most of 
the beef for the Confederate army. 

The entrance to the harbor of Charleston was defended by Fort 
Sumpter a pentagonal fort of small area on a ‘rip rap” foundation, 
located close to the main channel. It was constructed for three 
tier of guns with brick walls, the thickness of the walls and the 
artillery being of an absolete design, unsuited for the improve- 
ments in war implements of even that date. Fort Moultrie, across 
the main channel on Sullivan’s Island was a necessary adjunct for 
the defense of this channel, the two forts being mutually protec- 
tive. They had successfully defended this important harbor since 
the surrender of Fort Sumpter by Col. Anderson in the spring of 
1861. As it developed in this seige, the strength of this fort was 
that the face of the pentagon bearing on the inner channel could 
not be attacked on the water front until the enemies iron clads came 
within an 800-yard range of its battery of 8-inch rifle cannon. On 
the sides facing Morris Island its batteries quickly m made those 
batteries untenable. 

After this face had been mounted with six 8-inch rifle guns the 
Federal fleet attempted with their most powerful ironclads to push 
farther enough down the channel to enable their heaviest rifles to 
operates on this interior face. After a notable engagement in which 
one of their ironclads, the Keo Kuk, was sunk and the others would 
have been but for their retirement. Despairing of success on this lina 
of attack powerful batteries were erected on Morris Island facing the 
opposite side of the fortress, which was towards the last, threw 
rifled shells of 100 pounds and heavier. After getting the range of 
this three tier brick fort they pounded away night and day until 
the walls were a mass of ruins. It was told that the front and rear 
walls were penetrated at each shot. The garrison was not disheart- 
ened but as the ruins tumbled down on their heads, they proceeded 
to “burrow” underneath, making use of sand bags ‘and timber and 
other material for walling up the interior. A little steamer made 
night trips for years to the battery in bringing in this material and 
other supphes. In the end “galleries” were formed inside with a 
_ timber stockade facing the interior, “loop-heled” for small arms, so 
that in case the enemy carried the fort by “escalade” the garrison 
could retire inside the galleries and kill or drive off their assailants. 
This attempt was made on a dark night by a superior force coming 
from the direction of Morris Island in row boats. A lodgement was 
made on the top of the now levelled brickwork, but the garrisoa 


Al 


soon got in their work and the attack was repulsed, taking many 
prisoners. | 

These details are given as to Fort Sumpter because it is one of 
the most notable defences of a fortified position in history. After 
being under fire for almost four years with all modern implements 
of war, it was infinitely stronger at the time of its inspection by the 
writer than when the first projectile was hurled against it. The 
only two faces not exposed to their fire was that inner face with 
which the enemy had experimented with unsuccessfully and the Mor- 
ris Island side, the walls of which had become so thick from the 
tumbling down of the brick work from above as to be impenetrable 
by their heaviest shells. Sumpter could not be reduced except by 
first reducing Fort Moultrie which could only be done by an attack 
from the land, which appeared to be too big a job to be undertaken. 

It is not within the province of this sketch to give the details of 
military operations for the last few months of that four years’ strug- 
gle for the independence of the South. In the interval preceding 
the commencement of Sherman’s celebrated march of devastation 
towards the South Atlantic, General Hardee was informing himself 
through his staff of conditions existing in his new command. Among 
others the prospect for supplies of beef from Florida; an inspec- 
tion of Federal prisoners of war, and the available strength of 
troops for military operations. 
_ Sherman left Atlanta (after applying the torch to the part of that 

city that had escaped his attention) on November 15, 1864. As 
soon, as it ‘was developed that Savannah was his objective point on 
the Atlantic, Hardee gathered all the available forces that could be 
spared from other exposed points, (about 13,000 effectives, infantry 
and artillery), concentrated them at the latter point, covering the 
approach to the city on the northward side by strong field works, as 
soon as they could be constructed. Sherman reached his outworks in 
the first week in December protecting his command in similar fash- 
ion where necessary. It was absolutely necessary for Sherman to 
open communications with the Federal fleet blockading this coast, 
who had a large amount of supplies of all kinds for his army await- 
ing his arrival. Fort McAlister, a small but strongly fortified post, 
with a garrison of about 300 men guarding the mouth of the 

geechee River, was in his path. After a sufficient reconnaissance 
Hazen’s division of about 3,000 men was assigned the task of cap- 
turing this fort. After a vigorous defense it was carried by assault 
the enemy swarming over the works carrying it by escalade. This 
occurred on December 13th. 

It required some little time for the Federal commander. to refit 
his command with all necessary supplies, he in the meantime press- 
ing his lines close up to his adversary’s lines. 


42 


General Hardee was in close communication with the war depart- 
ment at Richmond and was given to understand the general policy 
to pursue, which was to save the troops and not allow himself to be 
penned up ultimately to surrender and to promptly vacate cities 
when necessary. This agreed with his own ideas and he had been 
quietly preparing for such a contingency, by having a pontoon 
bridge thrown across the several channels of the Savannah river. 

General Foster commanding at Port Royal on the Atlantic had 
made several demonstrations, as if to close Hardee’s outlet towards 
Charleston, but each time had been thwarted. 

Sherman’s army had been held at bay for about two weeks and 
the lines in front could have been held much longer, but that the 
demonstrations from Port Royal had become so threatening that 
Hardee made preparations to evacuate Savannah as soon as pos- 
sible. Accordingly on the 21st of December, at night he evacuated 
all the posts, and withdrew his army with all the lght artillery 
across the pontoon bridge and thence by a march of about twenty 
miles to the end of the railroad, at Hardeeville, leading to Charles- 
ton; the night being made lurid by the burning of the small naval 
fleet under Commodore Tatnall. The troops with the naval bat- 
talion reached the end of the railroad without mishap. Commodore 
Tatnall, now much past the meridian of life, somewhat stout, not 
at all cheerful after the loss of his ships, mounted on a very 
dilapidated looking horse, (had the situation not been so tragic), 
would have been a correct exemplification of the phrase of “a fish 
out of water.” 

At this time every train had to run the guantlet of a Federal 
battery that had secured a position something over a half-mile to 
the right, but it is believed there were no casualities of consequence 
resulting from this bombardment of the trains. _ 

The advance of Sherman’s army from Savannah during January, 
1865, caused the Federal fleet of Charleston to be quite active in 
making demonstrations along the Atlantic, as if threatening a land- 
ing; the most important one having been made at Bull’s Bay, 
thirty or forty miles north of Charleston. These movements all 
developed into mere demonstrations. Sherman’s march ‘was only 
confronted by the cavalry under Generals Wheeler and Hampton 
and by a few remnants of the Army of Tennessee, that had survived 
that disastrous campaign. 

When one wing of his army had reached Orangeburg, South 
Carolina it became apparent it was his intention to pass on toward 
ihe North East, thus isolating Hardee’s forces at Charleston and 
preventing their junction with the different remnants of the Con- 
federate Army under General Johnston in North Carolina. Acting 
under general instructions General Hardee had been gradually 


ee %2- a 
> the 
Aes 


43 


preparing for the ultimate alternative and on February 13th all the 
posts around Charleston were successfully evacuated and he suc- 
cessfully withdrew his army through Florence and Cheraw, mak- 
ing use of the railroad to the latter point as much as possible for 
troops and material. His troops reached Cheraw on March 2nd, 
ahead of Sherman’s advance and proceeded on its march through 
Fayetteville, North Carolina and thence to the vicinity of Smith- 
field (General J. EH. Johnston, present head quarters), on the 
17th of March. | 

In honor of the long and successful defense (four vears) of ihis 
celebrated fortress the eight rifle guns of Fert Sumpter that had suc- 
eessfullv repulsed the Federal fleet and remained intact at the evac- 
uation, ‘were not spiked. 

The evacuation of Charleston necessitated the destruction of 
almost the last remnant of the Confederate Navy under the com- 
mand of Commodore Ingraham, a name 1:ade memerable, in the 
old navy, by his resolute action in the famous “Costa” affair in the 


- Harbor of Smysna, for which that gallant cfficer received the thanks 


of the United States Congress. Captain I. N. Brown, also a noted 
officer of the old navy, commanded his flagship at that time. ‘T’he 
burning and blowing up these ships, together with the burning 
of a few bridges, on that memorable night, made a scene long io 
be remembered. 

Except for a slight engagement at Averyeboro, North Carolina, 
on the 16th of March and a more importent one at Bentonville, 


North Carolina, on the 18th of March, fighting closed until the 


surrender of this army on April 26th, 1865. 

The successful evacuation of Savannah with all the impedimenta 
ef a force of about 13,000 men on the point,of being shut up, by 
a force of 60,000 men, was managed by Hardee with his usual skill 
and ability. | 5 

The successful withdrawal of the scattered detachments from 
Fort Moultrie, Fort Sumpter, the several forts around the inner 
harbor, and from the islands facing Morris Islands, occupied by 
Federal forces, was an achievement still more difficult of accom- 
plishment. Yet it was done without a hitch or any friction and the 
to delivered at the end of the railroad at Cheraw, South Caro- 
lina, in sufficient advance of Sherman tv avoid an unequal en- 
counter. : 

The slight engagement at Bentonville deserves more than a pass- 
ing notice for at that encounter Willie Hardee was mortally 
wounded in the last charge of his regiment, the gallant Eighth 
Texas Cavalry—Willie Hardee, though a voungster under twenty 
years of age, had served on his father’s staff as an aide-de-camp. 
Not long before that date he had received the consent of his father 


44 


to enlist as a private in the Eighth Texas Cavalry, a regiment that 
had served with distinction, with the Army of Tennessee since the 
fall of 1861. 

At a critical moment in that Bentonville fight the enemy gained 
possession of a bridge from which it was important they should 
be driven. General Hardee being in the vicinity and realizing its 
importance rallied a small force and with the Highth Texas Cavalry 
charged the enemy, regained the bridge and held it until a sufficient 
force arrived to hold it. In that charge Willie Hardee received his 
death wound. This was one of the saddest events of that four years 
of tragedies. Willie Hardee was a noble boy to whom the writer 
was much attached, the idol of his father and the inheritor of his 
name. To think that after passing through so many ‘augers 
(father and son) he should fall in the last hours of a war fought 
in defense of a cause, however dear it may have been, yet at that 
date had practically proven a failure. 

After the engagement at Bentonville Sherman’s army passed on 
to the seaboard where it was outfitted with supplies of all kinds and 
at once commenced a movement on General Johnston’s army at 
Smithfield, the latter slowly retiring before him. In the meantime 
Richmond had fallen on April 2, Lee’s army had been surrounded 
near Appomattox C. H., and surrendered to Genera: Grant on the 
12th of April. President Davis and his cabinet had retired to 
Danville and afterwards to’ Charlotte, Nerth Carolina. Finally 
on the 26th of April General Johnston accepted terms from General 
Sherman, by which his army surrendered on the same terms as 
were granted to General Lee. Each soldier and officer were paroled 
and the remnants of the army dispersed to their several homes. 

The war had closed. 

The preceding sketch of that Western Army designated “Army 
of Tennessee” based on authentic records and upon personal knowl- 
edge of those details coming under the observation of the writer, 
shows the uniform success of the corps commanded by Lieutenant- 
General W. J. Hardee, in all the battles and military incvements 
of that four memorable years of conflict. In the campaign of 
1862, 1863 and 1864, the divisions constituting this corps were 
partly changed each year, with different division commanders. 

Though not familiar with the records of the several corps of 
“The Army of Northern Virginia,” it is believed that no corps of 
_ that army has a higher record for continued success. 

So then it would seem reasonable to suggest that Lieutenant- 
General Hardee, the commander of this corps should rank in mili- 
tary skill and ability with the most distinguished corps commanders 
of the entire Confederate Army. The writer has always classed 


with: Longstreet, “Stonewall” J ackson, possibly may be given 
K 2 over each. | : 


ch ove | WILLIAM D. PICKETT. 


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APPENDICES. 


APPENDIX A. 


During the following dates, the foregoing statements are not made 
from personal observation, as the writer was absenv from duty on 
“sick leave.” 

For thirty days after retirement of the army from Shiloh, during 
which Halleck had closed in on Confederate lines, at Corinth in 

From May ist to May 30th, 1864, Atlanta. From March ond, 
1865, to April 8th, 1865. 


APPENDIX B. 
THE RE-ENLISTMENT OF JOHNSTON’S ARMY. 


(Nashville Tennessean, Aug., 1909.) 


Editor Tennessean : 

Much has been said, as you doubtless know, relative to the re- 
enlistment of the Army of Tennessee, then under the command of 
Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, at Dalton, Ga., in the spring of 1864, 

a short time before the advance of Sherman. I would like, through 
the medium of your paper, to say a word on the subject, as I think 
I know as much about the matter as any other person now living. 
You will pardon the declaration, as it is made with becoming 
humility and lack of arrogance. 

It was a critical period in the history of the Confederacy. The 
two-year enlistment that had taken place while the army was at 
Corinth, Miss., just after the battle of Shiloh, was about to expire, 
and the summer campaign was soon to begin. ‘he Confederate 
government was confronted by a serious question. Congress knew 
not what course to pursue or what measures to adopt to obtain 
a re-enlistment of the army. They did not know that the soldiers 
would submit to a second conscription, and a voluntary enlistment 
was the great thing to be obtained, if it be possible, and it was 
hoped that some movement tending to that end would be made by 
the soldiers, thus dispensing and doing away with all drastic 


47 


measures. At that time furloughs were being given to some of the 
Tennessee troops as many of them were anxious to go home before 
the beginning of the campaign, which every one knew and feit 
would be long and bloody. I was one of that number. 

I had enlisted at Somerville, Tenn., early in the spring of 61 
in the company of Capt. Johns, known as the “Avengers,” which 
became Company A of the Sixth Tennessee infantry regiment, and 
after the battle of Shiloh, till the close of the war, was commanded 
by that gallant soldier and patriot, Capt. Robert C. Williamson, 
now deceased. At the date mentioned I put in my application for 
a month’s leave of absence, technically termed a furlough. Of course 
it was to encounter a good deal of “red tape” and had to pass the 
scrutiny and approval of all the headquarters from the captain’s 
on up to that of the commanding general. 

When I appeared before Capt. Williamson with my application 
he remarked that this question of the re-enlistment of the army 
was now a serious one—that the whole army and country were 
being affected by it; that our superiors did not know how to dispose 
of it; that they did not know what steps to take in regard to it, 
and that the movement should be inaugurated and set on foot by the 
privates and subalterns in the army i? they could in some way be 
prevailed on to do so voluntarily. He said that he did not know 
whether he could get me a furlough or net, but if I would agree 
to enlist for the war he would approve my application and take it 
up in person through all the channels as far as division headquar- 
ters, Gen. Cheatham then being our division commander, and that 
this prestige of re-enlistment would have, he had no doubt, a 
favorable consideration at the headquarters of our corps com- 
mander and also that of our commanding general; and that if 
I would agree to enlist he would also. After which he thought his 
whole company could be prevailed on to do likewise. 

After pondering over the matter for a few minutes, for it was 
a serious one, I agreed to his proposition and we both went up to 
the headquarters of Col. George C. Porter, now of your city, who . 
was then commanding the Sixth and Ninth consolidated regiment, 
and were sworn in by that officer “for the war,” all of which he no 

oubt remembers, and is'ready to verify. This was the first step 

hat was taken in the re-enlistment of the Army of Tennessee: for 
the war. 

The re-enlistment of mv whole company followed and before 
the sun ‘went down the entire regiment had followed suit. This 
patriotic feeling soon became epidemic, and it was not many days 
before the whole army had agreed to fight it out to the bitter end, 
which was bitter indeed. The re-enlistment of the army was hailed 


with delight at Richmond, Senator Ben Hii] of Georgia exclaiming 
from his seat in the senate, “All honor to the ’ennesseans.” 

This is a true and brief statement of the case, which, if necessary, 
can be fully proven. The seminal idea originated with Capt. R. 
C. Williamson of Fayette county, myself being the humble medium. 
by and through which it was put into execution. 

I deem it the greatest act of my lfe—cone that the greatest, as 
well as the humblest—lhke myself—might well be proud. But I 
failed to get my furlough. Being unknown to you, Mr. Editor | 
beg leave to respectfully refer you to Col. George C. Porter, John 
P. Hickman and Gov. D. Porter of Nashville, Judge Bullock, Capt. 
Amos Jones and Capt. Turner, President of John Ingram bivouac 
of Jackson, Tenn. 

VE SEE VG ae 
Orderly Sergeant, Co. A. Sixth and Ninth Tennessee. Maney’s 
Brigade. 
Jackson, T'enn., Aug. 6, 1909. ° 
The above is a correct statement of the case. 
GHORGE C. PORTER, 
Col. Sixth and Ninth Tennessee. 


APPHN DEX Gs 


In January, 1862, two cavalry officers, afterwards noted leaders 
in that army of the service, came to the front by daring deeds. N. 
Bedford Forest, of Memphis Tennessee, and John H. Morgan, of 
Lexington, Kentucky. 

N. B. Forest then a captain, with his battalion of four com- 
panies of cavalry in the country southwest of Bowling Green, (the 
point not exactly remembered) attacked a full regiment of Federal 
Kentucky cavalry, routed them and followed them some distance. 
It being in Hardee’s military department the report of the fight 
was made to his’ headquarters. 

Forest was highly complimented for the distinguished gallantry 
displayed in this achievement which was understood to have been 
his first success and gave him a start in his wonder{al career. 

About the same time John H. Morgan, then a captain in com- 
mand of one or two companies of cavalry performed a daring feat 
that first brought him to the front. 

With thirteen or fifteen men he started from the vicinity of 
Bowling Green, made the circuit of Generel Buell’s army at Mun- 
fordsville, obtained valuable information end brought back thirty 


49 


prisoners of war (thirty-three is my recollection) withont losing a 
man. Of course, to accomplish this feat, required a good deal of 
strategy, nor could it have been done, except by a small body of 
picked men. Each man was first supplied with the light blue over- 
coat of the Federal cavalry. When in the neighborhood of the 
enemy this overcoat was worn. On approaching a vicket vost, they 
were approached boldly and confidently and at the proper time, 
they would be covered with their rifles and surrender demanded, 
with which they invariably complied. Small detached lodies were 
treated in the same way. When necessary he passed his command 
as Federal cavalry. This performance was successfully repeated, 
until by the time he had made the circuit, there were the number 
of prisoners as before stated. As they were turned over to head- 
quarters to be sent to the rear there could not be much error in 
the number. This statement as to their adventures were told me by 
Morgan and his men. What astonished me still more was that 
these prisoners were extravagant in their praises of Morgan for the 
manner they had been treated as prisoners. J did not inquire of 
Morgan the cause of their praise, but suppose he trusted a good 
deal to their honor and gave them liberties 

Another similar incident occurred soon afterward. After the 
rearguard of the army occupied Murfreesboro, General Hardee 
understood that three hundred Federal cavalry had crossed the 
river at Nashville on the steamboat Minnetonka and more were 
expected to cross—he directed Morgan to burn it if possible. 

The order was received on the 25th of January. On the 26th he left 
his camps at Buchanan with twelve men, passed through the Fed- 
eral lines at Nashville and thence to the water front, discovered 
the steamer he was looking for, the Minnetonka, on the opposite 
bank, secured a skiff in which three men were sent, who boarded the 
steamer, drove off the roust-a-bouts in charge, fired tiie steamer and 
came back in safety. After waiting for the destruct’on of the heat, 
the party by a good deal of strategy, passed the Federal iines and 
reached camp at 12 o’clock at night, the only casualty being a wound 
received by Peter Atherton, one of his men. This was the substance 
of a written report. These two incidents of his early career brought 
him to the front and were merely the forerunners of those deeds 
of a similar character, with a larger command, that gave him a 
national reputation. 

Morgan and General Hardee were good friends and the latter 
always effectively endorsed his claims for promotion. On John 
Morgan’s marriage to Miss Reedy at Murfreesboro, Tennessee, just 
previous to that battle, General Hardee rode from his headquarters 
at Eagleville, on horseback about twenty miles, to be present. 
General Hardee evinced the greatest admiration for the military 


ol) 


genius of N. Bedford Forest. He has often expressed himself as 
classing him, as one of the few military genius produced by that 
war. 

The writer cannot refrain from noticing the stories that have been 
told by so-called friends of this distinguished officer within the last 
few years of heated clashes that are reported to have occurred helween 
him and other distinguished officers, sometimes with his own 
egenieral-in-chief. In some of these stories General Forrest is rep- 
resented as a ruffian and a bully. In other stories he is represented 
as guilty of such insubordination, that had he been a private 
soldier, his commanding general would have been justified by the 
articles of war in organizing a drum-head courtamartial and had 
him shot before sun set. 

General Forrest was too brave a man to have been a ruffian and 
bully and those who know him know to the contrary. He had too 
much love for the cause he fought for, to commit any act of insub- 
ordination, to his commander-in-chief, that if repeated, would cause 
so much harm to the cause. Those who published these stories — 
only give themselves unenviable notoriety, for those knowing this 
distinguished. officer disbelieve then. Forrest is not here to defend 
himself against these aspersions on his military and personal record. 
Let them be consigned to oblivion. There are too many scandal- 
mongers yet living at the North, who delight in repeating such 
stories. 


APPENDIX D. 


LIEUTENANT-GENERAL W. J. HARDEE 


Born in Georgia, October 10, 1815 
Died in Virginia, November 6, 1873. 


Married Elizabeth Douglas Dummett, St. Augustine, Fla., 1840. 
Four Children. 
Anna D. Hardee, Chambliss 
Sallie H. Hardee, Roy 
Willie J. Hardee, Jr., killed at Battle of Bentonville, North Carolina, 
March 18, 1865. 
Elizabeth D. Hardee, Gage 
Second Wife 
Mary F. Lewis, married 1863—Died, 1875. 
No Children. 


51 
APPENDIX E. 


Greensboro, North Carolina, May 2, 1865. 

In accordance with the terms ‘of the Military Convention entered 
into on the twenty-sixth day of April, 1865, between General 
Joseph EH. Johnston, commanding the Confederate Army and 
Major-General W. T. Sheridan, commanding the United States 
Army, in North Carolina. 

Colonel W. D. Pickett, A. I. G., Hardee’s corps, C. 8. A., has 
given his solemn obligation not to take up arms against the Gov- 
ernment of the United States until properly released from this 
obligation and is permitted to return to kis home, not to be dis- 
turbed by the United States authorities, so long as he observes this 
obligation and obey the laws in force where he may reside. 

W. J. HARDEE, 
Lieut.-Gen’l ©. 8. A., 
Commanding. 
G. F'. TOOLE, 
Major A. A. G. U.S. A. 
Special Commissioner. 

This is a copy of the original in my possession and is understood 
to be the same form of parole, as the parole given General Lee’s 
army at Appamattax. 


APPENDIX F- 


Ji has not been considered necessary for the purpose of this sketch 
to include in it, the operations of the column of about forty’ thou- 
sand men under the command of Major-General Georg 


“Fishing Creek” and the death of Brigadier-General Zollicofter and 
many other gallant soldiers. 


Cray 
tenden (on the upper Cumberland) resulting in the’ Battle of 


1 


on 
x 
re 


teres 


tee 


